# 1AC

#### The topic desires an economic space of free and fair competition a fundamental fantasy that only coheres the lies of neoliberalism. The political demands of anti-trust law are a more benign capitalist death machine – newly optimized market competition that still relies upon the exploitation and commodification of certain bodies to produce a thriving subject of wealth and capital.

#### Anti-trust law’s investment in a neoliberal model of transparency paves the way for intensified debilitating, racialized and gendered violence masked by reformism. Instead reform the law’s neoliberalization of economic and political life only an analytic debilitation and understand the layers of these violences.

Scanell 18 (R. Joshua, Assistant Professor New School of Media Studies. A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York. “Electric Light: Automating the Carceral State During the Quantification of Everything” https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3617&context=gc\_etds ppgs. 2- 15 GC)

In 1913, Brandeis is economic policy advisor to Woodrow Wilson and his Progressive New Freedom project. While Wilson makes himself busy Progressively segregating the federal government, the future justice of the Supreme Court focuses on banks. Against anti-trust regulation or nationalization, Brandeis argues that the best way to break financial houses’ control over the economy is to publish their service fees. Doing so, he claims, alerts investors to unfair practices, incentivizes them to invest with honest houses, and forces banks to behave fairly. “Sunlight,” he says, “is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman” (Brandeis 2009). Brandeis is wrong about sunlight regulating banks. In the absence of effective state regulation, they continue to concentrate power, and eventually collapse, triggering the Great Depression. But his slogan becomes a mantra for what Tariq Ali calls the “Extreme Center” of American politics (Ali 2015). The Extreme Center, made up of political agents of all parties whose allegiance is to the maintenance of free market capitalism at all costs, is in 2014 caught between the rock of “transparent” racial state violence and the hard place that necessitates statesanctioned armed cadres to maintain a fraying political economic structure. Overwhelmed, the extreme center insist that the facts aren’t in, and call for better data, and for better analytics. Or for what Lim, quoting Brandeis, calls “sunshine.” In the mid 2010s, that call for “sunshine” translates into the rollout of police worn body cameras on the one hand, and improved resource management software on the other. Critics like Elizabeth Joh point out that, from a civil rights standpoint, police worn body cams are a disaster (E. E. Joh 2016). She’s right (E. Joh 2016). The distinction between transparency (“sunshine”) and surveillance is fictive to begin with (Levy and Johns 2016). For instance: The Axon Corporation, formerly called Taser, is most famous for its formernamesake “less lethal” police weapon. But it is also the largest producer of police worn body cameras, among a range of other surveillance technologies and analytics systems. As early as 2010, Taser articulates a vision of integrating facial recognition technology into police worn body cameras that can scan crowds and match faces to outstanding warrants in real time (Gross 2010). In 2017, the company pivots its business model to analytics. In April 2017, the company announces that Taser is now Axon, and will offer free body cameras, as well as “supporting hardware, software, data storage, training, and support to police departments free of cost for one year.” Axon plans to use a proprietary, expanding database of body camera videos to develop 4 technology that can “anticipate criminal activity” by reading body language to warn officers if “someone’s demeanor has changed and may now be a threat” (Kofman 2017). So, the tool to achieve greater transparency (“sunshine”), and heal the trust deficit between police and “the communities they protect” is also how police surveillance generalizes, and how analytics automates carceral precarity, debilitating populations (Puar 2017). What the extreme center never says out loud is that the other side of transparency and sunshine is the policeman, and electric light. In September 2014, a few months before Lim publishes his article in Newsweek, the New York Times runs a report on policing in Brownsville, a poor and largely black neighborhood in Brooklyn. A new Mayor, Bill de Blasio, has recently been elected on the promise of ending the New York Police Department’s unconstitutional Stop, Question, and Frisk policy (Vaughan 2013). The reporter is in Brownsville to see what has changed since the city pivoted to its new strategy, called “Omnipresence.” He finds: police cruisers parked at every junction, emergency lights flashing until the early hours of the morning; powerful floodlights on all night pointed at public housing projects’ windows; officers patrolling building interiors with flashlights on and guns drawn; helicopters flying overhead, shining searchlights down at the neighborhood. Electric light, everywhere. One person who lives in the neighborhood tells the reporter that “[we] feel like we live under siege” (J. Goldstein 2014). Omnipresence is the brainchild of Commissioner Bill Bratton, who, in 2014, is pushing hard to drive NYPD’s information technology development. The NYPD’s Information Technology Bureau estimates that implementing the total wish list will cost $350 million. It includes plans to build a proprietary fiber optic network for the police, new data centers and cloud capability, efforts to link NYPD camera feeds with independent agencies (like NYCHA), to construct a citywide data fusion center under NYPD control, to expand the existing Domain Awareness System nerve center for processing data streams and to push that system’s platform to field officers, to install ShotSpotter gunshot detection centers city-wide, to contract predictive policing software as a service from a private company, to equip officers with body cameras, and to issue NYPD emails to officers (New York City Police Department 2015). These are a different sort of omnipresence; a different set of techniques for leveraging algorithms to bathe a city in electric light. In Dark Matters, Simone Browne introduces the concept of “black luminosity” as a framework for understanding the racializing violence that inheres in the productive surveillance of blackness. Black Luminosity is “a form of boundary maintenance occurring at the site of the black body, whether by candlelight, flaming torch, or the camera flashbulb that documents the ritualized terror of a lynch mob.” This boundary maintenance is “intricately tied to knowing the black body, subjecting some to a high visibility…by way of technologies of seeing that sought to render the subject outside of the category of the human, un-visible” (Browne 2015, 67-68). We might add to this historical list floodlights, CCTVs, facial recognition software, gait matching software, social media surveillance, data fusion, predictive policing, body cameras, surveillant 6 sensors, heat maps, compstat maps. In other words, the 21st century technological assemblage of black luminosity that underwrites American matrices of domination (Collins 2009). Algorithmic policing – Electric Light – is a deepening and extension of the boundary making that Browne identifies. Emerging concerns about digital surveillance technologies - that they inhumanize and dividuate people to circulate their data as valuable, securable information (boyd and Crawford 2012, Lyon 2011) are in some ways a much-belated realization of the process by which taxonomies of the body have organized and distributed population. Against the concern that digital surveillance presents a new problem of reducing people to constituent parts and alienates the subject from itself and from the law, we might look to Jennifer Morgan’s argument in Laboring Women that early modern European taxonomies of non-white women were central to nascent state projects of colonialism. These taxonomies laid the intellectual, financial, and ideological groundwork needed to produce captive labor forces on which new modes of capitalist accumulation could be built (Morgan 2004). Morgan argues that a fundamental technique of the production and circulation of what we now understand as “race” was European explorers’ efforts to “read” non-European women’s bodies as uniquely capable of producing new bodies for captivity through pregnancy and reproduction while also doing agricultural labor. This subtended a colonial fascination with the imagined physicality of the “indigenous other.” European “experts,” for instance, argued that nonEuropean women’s breasts were especially and monstrously elongated so that babies could be carried on their backs and “suckle o’er their shoulder” while they did agricultural labor. The (imagined) breast became a key metric, along with the supposed ease and painlessness of 7 delivery, by which Europeans determined the sliding scale of populational fitness for civilization or enslavement. Biometrics and racialization have always been of a part (Ajana 2013, Browne 2015, Duster 2003). And the racializing technologies of biometrics always require illumination. Eighteenth century British colonial authorities in New York developed what Browne calls “Lantern Laws” in response to widespread enslaved’ and indigenous resistance to the colonial regime. The white ruling class feared that the free and untracked movement of enslaved persons invited danger. Where enslaved people could freely meet and talk, they could strategize insurrection and plan revolt. These laws thus mandated that black and native persons, when walking two or more at a time and unaccompanied by a white person were required, after dark, to carry lit candle lanterns. They were made to be luminous (Browne 2015, 76-83). An urban reimagining of the rural “pass,” the Lantern Laws organized the imagined infrastructure of the city through the circulation of illuminated black and native bodies (Hadden 2003; Browne 2015). Colonial luminosity assembles surveillant technologies (candles, lanterns), racial technologies (bondage, property rights), capital (the sea, the ship, the financial instrument, the east India company) and imperial affects (the impetus for these laws is to defend the sanctity of the afternoon tea ceremony) to map carceral, colonial New York. Back to the future, in 2014, the New York Police Department assembles surveillant technologies (cctv, ShotSpotter, crime mapping, gait matching, facial recognition, automated license plate readers, predictive policing), racial technologies (incarceration, underfunded schools, rent gouging, poor wages), capital 8 (credit, real estate value, data farming, analytics), and imperial affects (the colorblind land of opportunity, the American dream) to map carceral, 21st century New York. As in Brownsville in 2014, so too in colonial New York: the mobility and opacity of free white colonial subjects depends on black and native bodies’ forced illumination. In their passage through the colonial city, black and native bodies were not only forced to present before the panoptic regard of the white gaze, they were constitutive of sovereignty’s field of vision (Kelley 1996, Bell 1992, Scott 1999, Ong 2006). As in the 18th century, so the 21st: racialized bodies’ “improper” movement (including the refusal to “move along”) in and through New York invites a range of punishments, up to and including torture and death. Surveillance, torture, capital, necropolitics, biometrics, carceral securitization, hot spot policing. The conflation of the terrorist and the criminal all coalesce across time and space. Light organizes race. Police tactics have not changed much. We may not call them “Lantern Laws” anymore, but NYPD’s “Omnipresence” strategy positions police floodlights in and around “high crime” neighborhoods so that the police can see, can “know,” when and where people of color move about the city. The designation of “high crime neighborhood” is itself a certain type of luminosity. The heat maps that transform the lived environment into a state target, and depress the constitutional protections of people living under conditions of “high crime” (Ferguson and Bernache 2008) are themselves the product of the ubiquitous racialized surveillance that Broken Windows reauthorized in the 1990s, and that Microsoft analytics digitizes on behalf of “the public.” Risk, heat maps, hot spots, and predictive policing are some of the 21st century’s techniques for illuminating the progress of “dangerous” bodies through the urban environment. 9 So, the logic of securitization endures. What has changed is that inhumanist techniques of “algorithmic governance” now deliberately disaggregate the metrics of flesh from any imagined figure of the human (Negarestani 2014a; Terranova 2007; Patricia T. Clough 2010). Electric light means an intensification of the violent, profitable production of flesh against the body, hidden behind mathematical parameters, and “progressive” reforms (Spillers 2003). There is not a contradiction between a more accountable and technologically savvy police department and siege. The former makes the latter possible. But the techniques of policing and organized dispossession (Harvey 2004) that constitute the “changing same” of American carceral capitalism are nonetheless transforming. Jasbir Puar writes about the Israeli occupation of Palestine as “inhumanist biopolitics,” in which state power turns on the deliberate debilitation and stunting of target populations (Puar 2015). This “right to maim,” she argues, is useful to contemporary modes of imperial rule that depend on comporting with the letters, if not spirit, of international human rights benchmarks. By rendering subject populations debilitated, rather than dead, regimes suspend victimized communities in a profitable interstice of “will not let or make die.” Populations in such necropolitical limbos provide the grist for expanding domestic security industries, non-governmental organizations, medical research, and other sectors whose use-value accrues from the profitable management of organized debility (Puar 2017). The term “inhumanist biopolitics” tracks two theoretical lines in this mode of debilitative governmentality. On the one hand, that it is biopolitical in the “classical” Foucauldian sense of 10 the word. It is a logic of governing that is dependent on figuring some populations’ bodies for maximum life and capacity and others for slow death (Berlant 2007) and debility through a positive feedback loop between state science, state racism, biological knowledge, and what David Beer calls “metric power” (Beer 2016; Foucault 1978). On the other hand, Reza Negarestani’s (2011) term, “inhumanism” denotes a break with the “human” temporalities and figures that frame “biopolitics” (Negarestani 2014b). Negarestani’s concept of the “labor of the inhuman” is dense, and I will not attempt a full excursus. To gloss, Negarestani argues that, “humanist” and “anti-humanist” conceptions of “the human” are rooted in nostalgic (imagined historical) or theological (either explicitly religious, phenomenal, or “natural”) reifications of “human” as coherent, and self-evident figure. Inhumanism reworks “human” as a process of constant renovation and construction – what he calls “the revisionary catastrophe.” His point is that, pragmatically, what “human” means is under incessant revision and stress, and that this stress comes “as a force that travels back from the future to alter, if not to completely discontinue, the command of its origin.” To commit, politically, ethically, or intellectually, to “human” means taking as a starting point the constant destabilization of “the human” that unfolds from the future. The systems through which “human” is distributed are multiscalar, complex, and functional (in the sense that they are processual and material). “Humans” do not preexist these systems’ feedback processes, which splay the “human” across diachronic temporalities. Negarestani means (I think) to develop the concept of inhumanism as a tool for liberation, as a means for reckoning with the failures of liberatory politics and philosophies to make sense of the ways in which cascading technics and technologies ontologically destabilize sociocultural units of analysis and action. While there is certainly merit 11 in this aspect of the project, inhumanism scans much more readily as Puar invokes it: as a schematic analysis of contemporary forms of (post)-biopolitical control. To return to Puar’s example of Gaza, we might ask how to conceive of the temporal scales of the epigenetic research streams that flow from Gazans’ toxified bodies. Militarized epigenetic research is driven by a speculative loop that aims to locate a proteinate source of Palestinian resistance to occupation. Occupation policy aims to debilitate “generational time” by inflicting “psychological and cognitive injuries” that “stunt” human development, foreclosing the possibility of children’s resistance in an indeterminate future. These tactics decant “the human” from its molecular composition to make Palestinians “literalized and lateralized as surface, as bodies without souls, as sheer biology, thus ironically rendered non-human, part of creating surface economies of control, and captured in non-human temporal calculations” (Puar 2015, 15). The ultimate target of these tactics of (literal) molecularization, and debilitation is an old “biopolitical fantasy, that resistance can be located, stripped, and emptied.” In these occupational dynamics, resistance itself’ becomes a target of computational metrics: How to measure, calculate, and capture resistance? But not only is biopolitical control a fundamentally productive assemblage; the ontological irreducibility of ‘resistance itself’ is elusive at best” (ibid). Eyal Weizman explains this conjunction of biopoltical control, transnational norms, computational capacity, and technocratic measurement in the context of possible soldiers’ defense against war crime charges brought under the framework of “International Humanitarian Law (IHL).” He notes that militaries have, in part due to pressure from international humanitarian organizations and national legal bodies, increasingly adopted automated and 12 robotic technologies to command, control, and govern the normative distribution of violence and death (Weizman 2011). This integration has transformed military action into a systemic process of command and control “that is undertaken by a diffuse assemblage of sensors, automatic weapons, computers and optics together with human operators, overseers and regulators.” This inhumanist structure makes it nearly impossible to identify, with any certainty, nodes at which war crime violations take place. Computers and sensors cannot be held responsible for the commission of crimes, and human operators are often acting under their “direction,” which is normally “designed” to inflict minimal, rather than maximal violence (Chamayou 2013). Weizman points out that this produces a perverse circumstance in which a human accused of committing war crimes might feasibly launch a legal defense on the grounds that they inflicted maximal possible violence. Against computers’ antiseptic program of minimally inflicted damage elongated over the maximal duree, the human warfighter evinces humanity by committing greater violence than is asked or “required.” As Weizman puts it, “The breach of the techno-civilized logic of computation and calculations could thus be argued as madness itself” (Weizman 2011, 16). Perhaps it is madness, but it reads like meticulous work. In particular, it conjures the infrastructures of human commodification that undergird the “intimacies of four continents” in the black Atlantic (Lowe 2015; Gilroy 1993). It reads like the “protocol of search and destroy” that Hortense Spillers identifies as the “zero degree of social conceptualization” between “body” and “flesh” (Spillers 2003). The digitally driven surveillance and control techniques that render Palestinians soulless “surface economies of control” may call to mind, as many have argued, a 13 posthuman reordering of Giorgio Agamben’s concept of bare life in an “algorithmic state of exception” (McQuillan 2015). But, following scholars like Alexander Weheliye (Weheliye 2014) I want to suggest that the musselman of the Nazi camps is not, as Agamben (Agamben 1999) argues, the zero degree of this moment’s methods for inscribing a “hieroglyphics of the flesh” (Spillers 2003). There is nothing particularly “exceptional” about the dehiscence of “human” from “flesh” (Moten 2008; Pitts-Taylor 2011a), nor have those terms historically relied on “life,” no matter how bare. Dylan Rodriguez argues in “Forced Passages” that the carceral organization and mechanization of the Middle Passage is the working prototype for the contemporary “prison regime” (Rodriguez 2007). For Rodriguez, the American prison regime, like the Middle Passage “is a point of massive human departure—from civil society, the free world, and the mesh of affective social bonds and relations that produce varieties of ‘human’ family and community” (Rodriguez 2007, 40) that exceeds economic logic. Although organized by and in response to assemblages of speculative capital, labor transformation, and mutually articulating state and economic crises, Rodriguez argues that both regimes are tutelary. In both cases, the regimes serve “a pedagogical and punitive” function that, in the case of Middle Passage “deployed strategies of unprecedented violence to “teach” captive Africans and coerce them into the methods of an incipient global ordering.” The Prison Regime has Come to form a hauntingly similar spatial and temporal continuum between social and biological notions of life and death, banal liberal civic freedom and totalizing unfreedom, community and alienation, agency and liquidation, the “human” and the sub- and nonhuman. In a reconstruction of the Middle Passage’s constitutive logic, the reinvented prison regime is openly articulating and self-valorizing a commitment to efficient and effective bodily immobilization within the mass-based ontological subjection of human beings (Ibid. 48). 14 Rodriguez points out that contemporary digital technologies of surveillance and control represent an “epochal leap from the carceral practices of the Middle Passage” that “Represents a multiplication of the potential sites and scenarios of subjection and physical punishment. This high technology re-maps prisoners’ bodies onto a virtual terrain, abstracting their bodily movements and gestures into a computerized grid of obedience and disobedience, submission and violation. Such innovations effect a re-spatialization of the prison itself, marking the extension and veritable omnipresence of the state’s capacity to practice a violent domination over its “inmates” (Ibid. 50). Technologies designed to extend the surveillant reach and punitive freedom of the carceral state are ontological conditions for racial capitalism, rather than the ramifications of a state of exception. To Agamben’s argument that the logic of “security” has, after 2001, instituted a sort of soft crisis in which biometric technologies that were “invented for recidivist criminals, [and] remained for longtime their exclusive privilege” have now been turned on the general population, thus undermining Western countries’ claim to “democracy” or even “politics” (Agamben 2014), we can posit Simone Browne’s point that race has always been a biometric project, and Western “democracy” and “politics” has likewise always been “impossible.” What Browne (2009) calls “digital epidermalization,” the “exercise of power cast by the disembodied gaze of certain surveillance technologies (for example, identity card and e-passport verification machines) that can be employed to do the work of alienating the subject by producing a ‘truth’ about the body and one’s identity (or identities) despite the subject’s claims,” does not have its roots in the “crisis” of the post-9/11 terror state, but the “mathematics” of racialization (Browne 2010, 135). Or, as Katherine McKittrick puts it, “the list, the breathless numbers, the absolutely economic, the mathematics of the unliving” to which the “pedagogical” regime of Middle Passage sought to reduce black life (McKittrick 2014, Rodriguez 2007). Digital policing technologies are a contemporary iteration of this mathematics. They are part and parcel of a 15 broad reorganization of the techniques and tactics of racialization and value concurrent with digital capitalism’s “quantification of everything” (Browne 2010, 2015). Just as Rodriguez argues that the rudimentary digital surveillant technologies of turn of the 21st century prisons were an “epochal leap” from the Middle Passage, I am going to argue that the contemporary datafication and mathematization of the world has conditioned another “epochal leap” in which the target of the carceral state ceases to strictly be “human,” or “life” but rather “population,” and “liveliness.” In other words, to circle back to Puar and Negarestani: policing is “inhumanist.” As an example, let’s consider predictive policing – a contemporary (if somewhat minor) technology that we will circle back to throughout the dissertation. Predictive policing consolidates and operationalizes risk, possibility, and insecurity as ontological indeterminacies against which apparatuses of security must be brought to bear in a state of durable crisis. This long crisis is both beyond exception in that it is mundane, and also in that it depends on the feeding back from the future of “inhumanist” (Negarestani 2014b) populations of insecurity. These are the predicted calamities to come – the digitally realized failures to act on a future subjunctive that hemorrhages consequences in the present. From the “perp” not arrested to the stock not shorted, the future materializes as demand for action in the present, and as the ongoing failure to not have acted “otherwise.” In practical terms, this means an intensification of policing surveillance logics and practices, and circulations of risk historically generated by the carceral archipelagos of racial capitalism (Nelson 2016, Duster 2012, Gandy 2009, Foucault 1995; C. Robinson 2000).

#### Anti-trust push for greater innovation to serve the community continues a consumption narrative rooted in ablenationalism

Mitchell and Snyder, 2015 (David T. – Professor of English @ George Washington University, and Sharon L. – faculty member @ George Washington University, The Biopolitics of Disability: Neoliberalism, Ablenationalism, and Peripheral Embodiment, p. 54-59, shae)

THE ABLE-DISABLED: NEOLIBERAL OVERCOMPENSATION STRATEGIES Whereas restrictions on the trafficking of hormones across the border between the United States and Mexico, surgical repairs of cleft palate in Africa, and the offloading of excess medical devices to disabled people in Haiti cultivate the appearance of a surplus provision of services in the United States, cultural images also serve to perpetuate a false sense of completed integration cultivated by ablenationalist standards. How do media images of disabled people materialize mainstream fantasies of a beneficent, evolving marketplace within neoliberal biopolitics? How does an increasingly visible transnational trafficking in technologically enabled disability images feed the moral culpabilities of postindustrial and industrializing economies alike? In one of the most rapacious zones of disability neoliberal market spaces-the popular sphere of product advertisements-disabled bodies are now ubiquitously referenced in commercials for myriad pharmaceuticals, prosthetically engineered bodies and minds, mutating organisms that may prove better adapted for a future world yet to come. Disabled people have become increasingly engendered by systems (and long, boring hours) of scientific observation, classification, and taxonomy, the predicative data, detail, and description amassed and leading to the micromanagement of increasingly informatic bodies. All of this data gathering attempts to render the nonnormative biological world a knowable object in the most Foucauldian sense. These particularly hyped-up, technologized, and fully rejuvenated bodies serve as cusp creatures hailing utopian worlds where access hasn't changed but bodily alteration has accomplished the necessary sleight of hand to accomplish the trick for some fortunate few. Those of us who find ourselves living with significant levels of socially assigned aberrancy and, we might add, over extended periods of a lifespan (such as formerly informed debates over the significance of age of onset in definitional discussions of disability) have metamorphosed within this product-oriented world into the equivalent of something no longer directly kin to a giant Kafkaesque beetle. While the representational space headed by iconic disabled types such as the Elephant Man or Gregor Samsa provided the basis for late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century eugenic justifications for the imposition of social stigmas translated into internalized self-hatred, what we will call the able-disabled, serve as latter twentieth-century champions of social normativity now held out to a select group of ~~upstanding~~ disabled citizens. For example, gracing a poster for the Emotion Pictures Disability Film Festival in 2006 in Athens, Greece, was a photograph of double-amputee turned hyperathlete, Aimee Mullins, speeding across a beach on one of her twelve pairs of artificial legs powered by resplendent coils ("My Twelve Pairs of Legs"). The image announced the arrival of yet another "new prosthetic age" originally hailed only in the 1970s fantasy space of serial television by the likes of the Bionic Man (Lee Majors) and the Bionic Woman (Lindsey Wagner). This new era of disabled athleticism-an era of buffed, muscular, yet technologically supplemented bodies-promises all of the transcendent capacity a hyperreal, medicalized culture could offer. We will unpack the creative alternative nuances of the workings and nonnormative politics of disability film festivals in chapters 4 and 5, but here we want to discuss the ablenationalist implications of hyperprostheticized bodies used as marketing ploy in this independent film festival market. Disability images circulate within neoliberal marketing networks by playing on rhetorical referencing strategies that grow increasingly common in the era of biopolitics as part of the coopting of geo-political space. Aimee Mullins's high speed romp across the shifting sands of a southern European beach used a disabled version of the attainment of bodily prowess to rejuvenate a lower threshold of public expectation for what disabled people might accomplish. This process of normalization through the ruse of hypernormalization placed members of formerly marginalized communities in the service of modernity-seeking nations attempting to glitz up their worldwide images through a form of special inclusion (i.e., ablenationalism). The hypercapacitated body of Aimee Mullins spoke to audiences by promising that the United States did not take its minority community members for granted. They were provided with the most artful, technologized, prohibitively expensive athletic enhancements modern Western civilizations can offer; in the one case a fetishized high-tech sneaker and in the other twelve pairs of prosthetic legs that allowed her double amputee body to course smoothly over even the most unctuous of mediums such as a sandy beach with speed and dexterity. Like Mullins, the South African double amputee-turned-paralympic (and then Olympic) athlete, Oscar Pistorius, also found himself incorporated into a narrative of overcompensation. Pistorius' s prowess for running on prosthetic coils was matched only by the notoriety he gained after shooting his girlfriend, the model Reeva Steenkamp, through the door of their bathroom one night in eastern Pretoria. Like Mullins, Pistorius was commonly pictured as embodying the hypercapacity of a field-and-track machine, a postorganismic cyborg biology enabled to surpass the limits of even the most athletically capacitated among us (two-legged variety). Pistorius's scientifically engineered body coupled the tragic truncated animacy of the disabled body with the self-governing automaton, like capacity of a machine. The tales of Mullins and Pistorius did not cohere to the traditional contours of a liberal overcoming story, one where a disabled person transcends the limitations of his tragic embodiment to attain a basic level of social participation (here the prostheticized body is hidden by a performative approximation of normalcy that can't quite successfully accomplish the level of dissimulation desired). Instead the hyperprostheticized bodies of Pistorius and Mullins are placed fully on display; the engineering feat of machinic supplementation becomes the primary object of fascination, and the viewer is left with a fetishization of technological compensation itself - not bodies extraordinary in their rescue from a disability abject, but rather a surfeit degree of compensation that suggests a wealth of supports available only to a select few: "the able-disabled.” In the neoliberal narrative of overcompensation assistive technology is the hero and the supplemented bodies become mere vehicles for an ornate display of a conspicuous form of technological consumption. The fetishization of a machine-like capacity is both a marvel of scientific advancement and a story of ablenationalism's promise of the arrival at a surfeit supplementation and support for vulnerable bodies now complete. Yet the lavish level of compensation for characters like Aimee Mullins and Oscar Pistorius occurs in the abstracted space of celebrity; a form of body augmentation that is completely divorced from the majority of disabled citizens lives. In the wake of the London Paralympic Games held during the UN's decade of the disabled person, Braye, Dixon, and Gibbons published a study that showed most disabled people in the United Kingdom found the athleticism of the paralympians irrelevant to their own lives as marginalized citizens ("Disability 'Rights' or 'Wrongs?"' 5). The prosthetic compensation received for these bodies had nothing to do with the everyday struggles they faced in getting a wheelchair or other medically necessary forms of supplementation. The level of multipersoned personal assistance provided to the athletes proved so excessive that many UK. disabled people worried over the growing disconnect with their everyday lives, where personal assistance was an undercompensated luxury at best and existed always under threat of cuts by the most recent austerity measure. Finally, paralympic overcompensation stories made their own precarious lives unreal as the ablenationalist story of completed nationalist project of inclusionism relegated their own below, the-poverty-level existences a relic of a past that remained all too present. In neoliberal narratives of overcompensation Pistorius's and Mullins's disabled bodies are not enabled as much as they enable forms of ablenationalism. In Pistorius's case his body was reinstated to its normatively upright position in the name of a remasculinized assistive technology's rescue of unproductive bodies from the scrap heap of late liberalism. Traumatically this augmentation also resulted in shooting of Pistorius's girlfriend seven times through a locked bathroom door. Apparently, the hyperprostheticized paralympian also came replete with the accoutrements of disabled masculinity's rehabilitation through militarization. Despite being armed with guns and confessing to the shooting, Pistorius was ultimately found guilty of "negligent killing" but not murder by a South African court. The excessively engineered disabled body in these instances is transformed into a machine of nationalism, one whose individual capacities via prostheticization could be catapulted to a geopolitical stage on behalf of the nation's claims to a postapartheid contemporaneity. Disabled people watching these displays of excessive technologization from the sidelines felt quickly overshadowed by such images. One might recall the festishization of hyper-capacitated athletic bodies forwarded in Paul Gilroy's critique of the flying, jamming, and basketball shot-producing African American body of Michael Jordan. According to Gilroy,Jordan's hyperathleticized body represented the ultimate trafficking of a racialized image across the space of the Atlantic Ocean from the United States to Europe to Africa and back (Against Race 185). The advertising provided an ironic "positive" reversal of the devastation precipitated for Africans during the Middle Passage of the triangular slave trade. The image had little to do with the contemporary experiences of most young black men in urban centers longing to emulate the body ideals of such a media-created, hyperprostheticized, ornate sneaker-hawking celebrity. Yet the monolith of Jordan's image and the marketing empire on, behalf of Nike he inspired did much to create a space where more mundane activities, such as bookishness, in the pursuits of nonnormatively athleticized racial bodies were eclipsed as worthy cultural activities. In other words, Jordan's oiled, athletic body destroyed the legitimacy of a wider variety of black male pursuits in his tongue-lolling flight with an orange basketball to the netted rim of the basket. The multinational ascendancy of Michael Jordan became an iconic emblem of a newly rehabilitated black masculinity that normalized a version of black men made palatable for the extranormative longings of less well endowed white men, those who might have been better off studying in college or working a trade in the shadow of a more spectacular moment in racialogical salvation trafficking through the popular culture sphere of male athleticism (Gilroy, Against Race 63 ). The representational repertoire of the 1980s and 1990s wiped out a variety of "lesser" politicized pursuits engaged by those bodies seeking to cross various abject corporeal boundaries such as access to public space and art forms claiming plural embodiments as a source of creative insight. Mullins' s image in the year of 2006 was paralleled by other forms of "positive and affirming" kinds of disability representation popularly narrated in the cultural lineage of the X-Men (2000). The X-Men have significant-even severe-incapacities but also harbor extrahuman compensatory abilities. Compensation narratives-or, rather, schemes of stigma-destroying superpower overcompensation-rule formulas of neoliberal explanatory systems. Such systems enshrine the body that is different yet enabled enough to ask nothing of their crumbling, obstruction-ridden infrastructures, continually naturalized as environments made for most, but not by any means all, bodies. These enhanced supercrips are celebrated by post-Fordist capitalist cultures and socialist governments alike as symbols of the success of systems that further marginalize their "less able" disabled kin in the shadow of committed researchers and policy-makers conjoined to technologized creaming practices for the able-disabled.

#### These neoliberal economic structures produce a mechanism that assign value based upon the economization of futures to determine the productive good life. This creates a toxic productivity of eugenic necropolitical control that culls non normative subjects to produce an able normative collectivity. This Economization of life becomes reproduced through human capital.

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Biocapitalism and the economization of life marks a way of talking about more and less valuable lives in economic terms rather than solely in biological terms. The economic viability of disability in Landrigan and Grandjean’s studes are comprehensible precisely because of the ways by which disability has been entrenched in neoliberal biocapitalism. Neoliberalism as a social and economic reorganization of capitalism and governance intervenes extensively and invasively in every area of social life, including life itself. Michelle Murphy (2011) calls this “the economization of life,” that centers on the profitability of future-oriented human biocapital. Neoliberalism is the economization of life such that the future of life is intimately tied to profitability and productivity. Life is made to live—have a future—if it is profitable, while unprofitable life has no future and is made to wither. Neoliberal biocapital, in its orientation towards multiplicity and differentiation, seizes on the economization of life to govern all forms of living being “for the sake of fostering economic development and enhancing national GDP” (Murphy 2011, 29). As such, capitalism becomes neoliberal biocapitalism, which has particular consequences for how we critically pair disability and toxicity together. Murphy (2013) argues that neoliberal notions of “human capital” depend upon “the embodied capacities of a person that can produce future economic benefits for that person, her employer, and even her national economy.” Murphy’s work on the economization of life argues that as neoliberalism developed throughout the mid-to-late 20th century, it became increasingly common to render and govern lives in purely economic terms (for example, as more or less valuable). In the economization of life, normal and abnormal biology are less important than how different forms of life can be made profitable. Murphy (2011), drawing on Foucault’s formula of the racial state, notes that practices of population control have been tied to GDP and GDP per capita, resulting in a “eugenic necropolitics” that “declared that some must die so that others may live more healthfully… some must not be born so that future others might live more abundantly…” (2011, 30). While embodying “human capital” means mitigating any risks to our embodied capacities as a population, neoliberalism is a system of individualization that “‘privatizes’ the risks and capacities of populations onto individuals, encouraging them to take charge of their own exposure to risk or opportunity in relative isolation or independence” (Hengehold 2007, 16). As Laura Hengehold remarks (2007, 274): The privatization or individualization of risk was a change in governmental technique, implemented by cutting back on many of the social insurance programs and legal protection programs of the welfare state. It was designed to extract a little more profit and self-care from citizens’ embodied subjectivity, and to reduce the state’s obligations to mediate between the rich and poor. But it did so by moralizing the act of work, by valorizing entrepreneurial risk-taking when employment was lacking, and by evaluating communities and affinities based on how well they promoted such activity. As quality of life measures, selective abortion, pre-natal screening and other invasive reproductive medical practices highlight, in the contemporary economic and social moment, the economic devaluation of a disabled life transforms it into a less-viable life and the source of preventable economic costs in the future. However, individual risk is not limited to the individual but to the future life that individual produces or has the potential to produce. Economization does not just effect the present but is also speculative: embodiment becomes a value that is future-oriented. As Melinda Cooper (2008) argues, key to future-oriented human capital is reproduction. The rise of neoliberal governmentality encourages competitive behaviour and gives individuals the responsibility “for preventing or surmounting risks” (Hengehold 2007, 13). Furthermore, as Murphy argues (2011, 33-34), such risks are not limited to one generation as research has shown that exposure to chemicals can effect the future reproductive capacities of fetuses. Specifically, Murphy notes how research done on pregnant mice exposed to the estrogenic chemical bisphenol A (BPA) “has found that the significant effects occur not so much for the fetus in utero, but for the eggs being formed inside that fetus, and hence effects are manifest for the potential grandchildren…” (2011, 33-34). This kind of research precisely marks the ways by which economization does not just effect the present but also creates future-oriented speculative value. 13 Part of this economization of life is a result of the clinical gaze being supplanted by the molecular gaze, so much so that many living in neoliberal biocapitalist economies have come to experience themselves and their individualized risks in highly profitable biocapitalist terms. This is reflected in Grandjean and Landrigan’s message across various media interviews encouraging pregnant women to eat “organic,” to remove wall-to-wall carpeting which can trap chemicals, and to ensure that grass or sportsfields have not been sprayed with pesticides before children play there (Weintraub 2014; Hamblin 2014; Woerner 2014). With normalizing discourses representing disability as the failure of the body to meet some normative standards, toxicity acts as a potentially polluting element that must be fixed, eliminated, or tolerated, all costly options. This continues neoliberal speculative futures and progress narratives as hope, mobilized in the originating moment of bodily failing (be it by accident, illness, or, increasingly, in probing human genetics), facilitates progress (optimism for cure, or miraculous medical intervention as the solution to the problematic deficient body, finding ways to integrate disabled bodies into the economy). Normative discourses of disability have not disappeared; people still want “a healthy baby” to such an extent that disability deeply disturbs this desire. There is an important relationship between the desire for a healthy baby and health cast as an economic argument. However, there are further tensions in that disabled bodies can also be a source of revenue and a site of investment. As opposed to seeing disability exclusively as the basis for exclusion and disabled bodies as objects to be normalized, Jasbir Puar (2011) has come to question how economies of disability – that capacitate some disabled bodies while leaving other unproductive disabled lives to wither – produce differential forms of disability in neoliberal economies. The silent pandemic of toxic exposure related disabilities is not outside of these economies.

#### The value from the economization of futures creates a future for some bodies allowed to thrive but not others forced to whiter which resides in a western enframing of bodies that are subject to violence based on a ontological relationship to “being debilitated” – tinkering with reform or economics doesn’t change that subject position, it just renames it with a neoliberal enframing.

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“My future is written on my body,” Alison Kafer writes on the opening page of Feminist, Queer, Crip (2013, 1). Resisting the way in which her wheelchair, burn scars, and gnarled hands enable some to mark her future as a life of “pain and isolation,” “a life not worth living,” and “a future no one wants,” Kafer instead offers a “politics of crip futurity” as a way of imagining and orienting to her future otherwise, one that is “ripe with opportunities” (1-3). If, as Rosemarie Garland-Thomson argues, disability remains unexpected in our world because we do not imagine disabled people as having tractable futures (2012, 351), then crip futurity becomes an important site to both imagine and materialize tractable disabled futures. Pushing against this lack of future, Kafer yearns for an “elsewhere” and “elsewhen” (3) of crip futurity—of desiring disabled futures otherwise—while remaining aware, following Nirmala Erevelles (2011), of the inequitable social and material conditions under which the desire for crip futurities is produced, circulated, and celebrated. That is, through practices of neoliberal biocapitalism, the lack of tractable futures for some disabled people works alongside the tractable futures of enhanced or capacitated disabled people, embedding crip futurities within the inequitable inclusion practices of neoliberalism. It is precisely at this juncture that I wish to consider the contemporary social, political, and economic constraints of desiring disabled futures otherwise by tracing the ways in which some disabled futures have already gained traction, albeit at the expense of others. In other words, I argue that the material discursive practices of neoliberal biocapitalism have enabled the tractability and flourishing of particular disabled futures while other disabled futures remain unanticipated, unexpected, and undesired. In this article, then, I argue that it is necessary to crip neoliberal futurity so as to enable the flourishing of critical practices of an elsewhere and elsewhen of disability. The withering of some disabled lives and the capacitation of others result from neoliberal material and discursive processes that orient and imagine disability as a life without a future unless capacitated through such biocapitalist practices as cures or body/mind enhancement technologies and procedures (see Fritsch 2015). Neoliberal futurity organizes disability in such a way so as to make disability intelligible through the suffering disabled child who is never imagined or anticipated to grow up or have a life worth living. Through neoliberal futurity, this suffering disabled child is figured as the negation of the future, or as a subject with no future. At the same time, however, neoliberal futurity also speaks to the difference of the futures imagined for some disabled children: biocapitalist futures, premised on the hope of overcoming disability through cure or body/mind enhancement. Building on Lee Edelman’s (2004) critique of “reproductive futurity” that privileges the Child as the image of the future, I contend that neoliberal futurity produces the figure of the disabled child that is productive—as far it creates varied discursive and affective economies aimed at preventing life, ending lives, capacitating some bodies, and re-investing a caring public in biocapitalism—and also re-inscribes the hope for a future without disability or, at least, a future in which disability no longer seems to be a difference that matters. That is, I show that it is at the confluence of this double lack-of-futurity—disabled children without futures and a future without disability—that some disabled adults become unanticipated lives left to wither while others become capacitated as inspirational, hopeful, and progressive success stories of neoliberal inclusion. By reading across a number of discursive and material sites, I show through a breadth of examples the recurring logic of neoliberal futurity in its variance and repetition, marking neoliberal futurity not as a project of homogenous actions and desires, but rather as productively diverse in the ways in which it participates in a double lack-of-futurity for disability. I explicate how some disabled people flourish in the future precisely because their futures gain traction through neoliberal biocapitalist practices and that these tractable futures demand that others have no future. Reproducing Neoliberal Futurity and the Disabled Child In No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, Lee Edelman (2004) argues that the contemporary political order privileges heteronormativity by inciting the Child as the image of the future (2-3). Edelman calls this child-centered “ideological limit” and “organizing principle” of social relations “reproductive futurism,” a cultural and political way of investing in a better future for the sake of our children (2). For Edelman, the field of politics is steeped in the figure of the Child, so much so that “the image of the Child invariably shapes the logic within which the political itself must be thought” (2) and is the “fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention” (3). He notes: “We are no more able to conceive of a politics without a fantasy of the future than we are able to conceive of a future without the figure of the Child” (11). Thus, within this heteronormative logic, a better future is always a better future for the Child. Edelman comments that refusing this mandate made by political institutions to compel the collective reproduction of the Child must “appear as a threat not only to the organization of a given social order but also, and far more ominously, to social order as such, insofar as it threatens the logic of futurism on which meaning always depends” (11). The ever “lengthening shadow” of the Child “terroristically holds us all in check and determines that political discourse conform to the logic of a narrative wherein history unfolds as the future envisioned for a Child who must never grow up” (21). While Edelman is largely interested in the ways in which reproductive futurism figures the Child within contemporary American political discourse, my work builds on Edelman’s critique to mark the ways in which neoliberal futurity mobilizes the suffering disabled child to create a future in which the child never grows up, or only grows up through the practices of biocapitalism. Thinking through Edelman’s critique of reproductive futurism, it is important to consider how the figure of the suffering disabled child organizes the way in which the future of disability and disabled people are imagined within the ongoing neoliberalization of psychic and material life in North America. That is, it is important to consider the role played by the figure of the suffering disabled child within what can be called neoliberal futurity. Rather than a temporal direction of time, neoliberal futurity speaks to a shared social imaginary of progress that underwrites capitalist relations, a frame of thinking made possible by the mode of production and the ongoing pursuit of surplus value. Franco Berardi terms this imaginary of progress—that the future will be better than the present—the “myth of the future,” a myth that is not “a natural idea” but rather is “rooted in modern capitalism” and the “bourgeois production model” (2011, 18). Neoliberal futurity—based on an economy of always more surplus value to extract, always new markets to develop, always new ways to download social responsibilities onto individuals, always evermore ways to exploit the many in order to benefit the few—requires a child that will overcome the odds and rise up to meet the new demands of the economy. Neoliberal futurity, then, inspires parents to invest—and go into debt—to produce an entrepreneurial kindergartener that eats the right food, goes to the right school, and has all the right opportunities available to them so as to best prepare them for the hypercompetitive, individualistic future (for example, see Webb 2013).

#### Debate is part and parcel of Neoliberal ableism’s demand for endless self-optimization produces ontological self-invalidation. No matter how much energy, attention, focus, and care are put in there is always further to go. The impact is exhaustion and cruel optimism.

Fristrup and Odgaard, 2017 (Tine – Associate Professor in the Danish School of Education @ Aarhus University, and Christopher Karanja – Master’s in Educational Sociology, “Interrogating Disability and Prosthesis Through the Conceptual Framework of Neodisability”, *Women, Gender & Research* No. 2, shae)

According to Dan Goodley, the logic of neoliberal-ableism is a philosophy that pursues “the (hyper) normal” (Goodley 2014, xiv). Hyper normality echoes Fiona Kumari Campbell’s understanding of ableism as an epistemology locating “the perfect, species typical and therefore essential and fully human” (Campbell 2001, 44). The entanglement “between epistemologies (knowledge-forms) of ableism and the production of internalised ableism” (Campbell 2009, 23), as Campbell argues “induce an internalisation or self-loathing” (Campbell 2009, 20). In his book titled Psychopolitics (2017) Byung-Chul Han defines our contemporary ableism as a form of neoliberal psychopolitics which is dominated by the excess of positivity and works with positive stimuli “as a machine of positivity and with the compulsion always to achieve more and more” (Han 2017, 32). The imperative of neoliberal-ableism in a psychopolitical framing is the workings of boundless optimisation leading to mental collapse because “the ego grapples with itself as an enemy” (Han 2017, 30). Our understanding (as well as critique) of neoliberal-ableism in a psychopolitical framing coincides with Hi´ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart and Tamara Kneese’s formulations of neoliberal self-care, as “[b]oth a solution to and a symptom of the social deficits of late capitalism, evident, for example, in the way that remedies for hyperproductivity and the inevitable burnout that follows are commoditized in the form of specialized diets, therapies…” (Hobart & Kneese 2020, 2). When unpacking compulsory ableist notions, we begin to address what Han calls “the course of inaugurating the age of exhaustion” (Han 2017, 30). Contemporary ableism operates in the realm of the burnout society (Han 2010); where neuronal power functions in favour of hybridisation beyond borders, transitions, thresholds, fences, ditches, and walls in order to accelerate universal change and exchange. The excess of positivity concerns the surplus positivity and the violence of positivity “that derives from overproduction, overachievement, and overcommunication” (Han 2010, 5). According to Han, “the violence of positivity does not deprive, it saturates; it does not exclude, it exhausts” (Han 2010, 7); and depression, ADHD and burnout syndrome are all indicators of an excess of positivity. Mental maladies such as depression and burnout “express profound crisis of freedom as they represent pathological signs that freedom is now switching into manifold forms of compulsion” (Han 2017, 2). When building from Han’s approach to psychopolitics, we disclose an achievement economy that is working beyond overcoming physical resistance and in the direction of optimising physical processes. In this setting, we take Sharon L. Snyder and David T. Mitchell’s understanding of the biopolitics of disability within contemporary neoliberal biopolitics that “references all bodies as deficient and in need of product supplementations to treat the in-built inferiority within, a system of bodily referencing shorn of environmental causes” (Mitchell and Snyder 2015, 39-40) in the direction of the psychopolitics of ability. In the conceptual framework of neodisability, the psychologicalisation of ableism does not emphasise the Cartesian split between body and mind because contemporary ableism can be elaborated as a way of making governable bodies through psycho-power which (as Han points out) follows the political rationality of bio-power (Han 2017). Our conceptualisation of neodisabilty does not subscribe to any clear-cut distinction between able-mindedness and/or able-bodiedness when􀉸 scrutinising􀉸 ableism. When we elaborate contemporary ableism through the prism of neoliberal psychopolitics, we are standing on the shoulders of different disciplines embracing body politics as a crucial point of reference, following the feminist thinking of Donna J. Haraway. Haraway points to the union of the political and the physiological by underlining that “bodies, then, are not born; they are made” (Haraway 1991, 208). When applying the non-essentialist body politics of Haraway to the framework of neodisability, bodies are made through contemporary ableism and the knowledge available to produce govern-able subjects that live by the affective formation of cruel optimism (Berlant 2011) embedded in the union of the political, the physiological and the psychological. When analysing ties between affect studies and critical disability studies, Dan Goodley, Kirsty Liddiard and Katherine Runswick-Cole (2018) describe the ramifications of Lauren Berlant’s notion of cruel optimism as producing “feelings of emotional and ontological invalidation” (208) with the risk of “causing emotional distress, as one fails to match up to the labour and consumption demands of late capitalism” (209). With cruel optimism enveloped in the achievement economy, practices of prosthetic solutions alter distinctly, as the notions of failure are embedded in the achievement economy, shifting “the prostheses’ function from supplementation to enhancement”, according to Hsiao-yu Sun (2018, 15). This entails that rehabilitating efforts relying on prosthetic solutions likewise shift their emphasis: from substitution in order to overcome disablement/disability to optimisation in order to retain abledment/ability. In a medical approach to disability, prosthesis signifies the absences or deficiencies of the disabled body, thereby functioning as a substitution by adding or supplementing normalcy and wholeness to the abnormal and inadequate body. When we operate in an achievement economy, the rehabilitating efforts of self-optimising processes work through an understanding that prosthesis is “the invisible prosthesis of willpower” (23) in search of perfectability. This exploration of prosthetics counters the emergence of the normal body as neodisability by accentuating the current promotion of the hypernormal body through a kind of nonmaterial prosthetic embedded in never-ending therapeutic interventions that maintain the psycho-neoliberal- ableist prerogative. A case of neodisability in higher education To demonstrate how the conceptual framework of neodisability works, we present an outline of a statement written by a Danish student named Naja Momberg Christiansen, published in the Danish newspaper “Dagbladet Information” on 22 June 2019: The market has made me mentally ill. It is nourished by the fact that we feel bad about ourselves. Although I think I can see through the neoliberal market logic prevailing throughout society, I am unable to escape from it. It has installed a sense of inferiority in me which has triggered an eating disorder. [ ] Unfortunately, I cannot find any answers to this problem. However, I realise that the neoliberal, economic mindset has become the answer to the serfdom of ancient times, but places Man in the very chains from which it once freed us. [ ] You cannot be present without constantly being confronted with your inferiority - more or less unspoken: You are not good enough. You cannot cope with the labour market today without focusing on how to be more efficient and productive by moderating and improving your efforts (Christiansen 2019 – translated by the authors). This student claims that the neoliberal configuration of contemporary society has triggered her eating disorder. At Aarhus University in the spring semester of 2016, it was discovered that the number of students availing themselves of the special educational support service owing to psychological or neurological diagnoses had increased by 27 per cent over a two-and-a-half-year period (Omnibus 2016). This radical increase in the number of students seeking this kind of help in the year 2016 aligns with the study progress reform in Danish higher education in 2014, a reform which aimed to reduce the average length of time students took to complete their university education. There were changes in Danish higher education in the wake of neoliberal reforms of austerity, with modalities of time, speed and support entangling and creating new forms of precarity embedded in the production of deficiency and inferiority, and causing a radical increase in psychological and neurological disorders among students at Aarhus University from 2014 to 2016. The university’s special educational support service has become a personalised prosthetic solution to an inherently political problem. When the number of psychological and neurological disorders increases in society and higher education, it engenders psychopolitical prosthetic solutions such as support systems based on forms of therapeutic interventions. At Aarhus University, the Support Centre has become a self-contained unit inside the university with its own finances. In 2012 it had a budget of DKK 33 million (Aastrup 2011), which was two years before the implementation of the study progress reform in 2014 pointing to the 27 per cent increase in psychological and neurological diagnoses. Whether the budget has increased with the same percentage can only lead to speculation in how the enterprise has grown. The therapeutic (and in this case pedagogical) efforts in the support system have led to what the Danish economist Mogens Ove Madsen (2009) has called an “entrepreneurial university” embedded in a globalised knowledge economy, acting on the premise of the market in creating new enterprises as a consequence of the university reform in 2003. Such a marketisation of higher education has developed a support system that seems to function as a prosthetic arrangement for students with diagnoses. Until 2012, the special educational support offered to students with a diagnosis by the Support Centre at Aarhus University was framed by educational psychology based on Lev Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory combined with philosophical enquiries into existentialism and psychoanalysis (Dræby Sørensen 2016). This combination is no longer applied in the Support Centre’s pedagogical interventions, which are now based on the perspective of Vygotsky alone (Pedersen and Pors Knudsen 2015). The support works as a prosthetic pedagogy through Vygotsky’s concepts of scaffolding and zone of proximal development, enabling students with a diagnosis to learn what they do not yet know through the guidance of teachers or advanced peers in processes of mentoring. Mentoring reframes the individual problems embedded in medical diagnoses by emphasising structural problems in order to overcome the diagnostic deficit approach (Pedersen and Pors Knudsen 2015). The educational support system works through the deficit model legitimised as a way to compensate the physical, psychological and neurological deficits or impairments operating on the logic of disorders as pathological a thus as an anti-thesis to normalcy and therefore in need of a pros-thesis in order to rehabilitate the equilibrium from before the deficit through prosthetic solutions. At the Support Centre, they try to resist the synthetic closure in the dialogical framework of thesis/antithesis/synthesis through a prosthetic pedagogy embedded in scaffolding as a prosthesis that will act as an enabler and not a disabler. In this regard, the prosthetic arrangements in the Support Centre employ knowledge of critical psychology aiming towards sustainability in order to prevent students from developing mentoring dependencies. This effort, focusing on the sustainability of the student’s subjectivity, underlines the pedagogical approach to prosthesis in contrast to the therapeutically orchestrated configuration of prosthesis, the latter enclosed in the will to dependency as part and parcel of the support systems, i.e. the prosthetic solutions, engendering the imperative of growth and perfectability within neoliberal economics and contemporary ableism. Contemporary ableism embraces prosthesis as the representation of excess pointing to the excess of positivity rooted in the neoliberal marketisation and the economic ordering of society. Vygotsky’s scaffolding and zone of proximal development affirm a learning distance between the present and the future where the former, within the ‘entrepreneurial university’, translates into diminished and the latter into augmented in accordance with neoliberal marketisation and the production of ‘surplus’. The overcoming of this distance is the continuous aiming at excessing positivity as the never-ending pursuit to get a step closer to the value of surplus. Unfortunately, this exhausting effort, as intrinsic it might be to contemporary ableism, evokes cruelty in its practice, because one will never succeed in reaching excess. No matter how much energy is put into the effort, one will continue to fail as the goalpost of ableism continues to be out of reach. This is the ongoing process of internalised disabling, or as we would like to present it here in the conceptual framework of neodisability: an ongoing process of (bodily) dis-ing. As Goodley and Runswick-Cole (2016) argue, to dis is to trouble. Following this understanding, we separate dis and ability into a bifurcation rubbing against the forward-slash on both sides demonstrating how the forward-slash incarnates the prosthetic arrangements in excessing positivity. We simply place excess on the right side of the forward-slash, thus illustrating the connection between excess and ability, showing how the ‘dis/’ continuously tries to overcome the forward-slash as if it was a barrier in order to approach excess illustrated through ‘/ability’ or ‘/ableism’. The ‘dis/’ displays deficiency and inferiority with a relational reference to perfection and superiority as ‘/ableism’. This process emerges clearly in the case of the Danish student Naja Momberg Christiansen and her experience of inferiority propelling an eating disorder because of the constant pressure to overcome ‘dis/’ and move towards ‘/ableism’ as being preyed upon by the compulsory excess of positivity. This process of dis-ing highlights the disjunctive, incongruous and fragmented bodily terrains in search of excellence, desiring excess of positivity. In these desiring efforts, the dis becomes a formation of ‘dis/ability’ and lacks the possibility of troubling ‘/ability’. It is the desiring efforts that engender inferiority as people turn their aggression against themselves in a constant process of dis-ing parts of themselves as not-yet-fit (not necessary degenerated) but in constant need of therapeutic interventions or quick fixes. Neodisability becomes a way to conceptualise the interdependency between ‘dis’ and ‘ability’ through the forward-slash in dis/ability, which underlines our point of departure in critical dis/ability studies.

#### Thus, we advocate for a rejection of the call of the resolution’s demand for endless production and competition and instead affirm productivity without productivity within a new rubric of time that operates not within a western notion of linear time but instead a crip time that cultivates new relationships to temporality that decenters the desire for futurity and new compositions and instead de-composition as political project.

Jung 19(Katie. Katie Jung has a Master of Arts from Concordia University Concordia University. “Productivity Without Productivity: Crip Theory, Interspecies Collaboration and Material Art Practice”. Accessed 1-19-22. https://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/id/eprint/985835/8/Jung\_MA\_F2019.pdf//LS)

I deploy art practice to develop a new articulation of what crip theorist Alison Kafer calls “crip time.”11 Drawing on Judith Halberstam’s notion of queer temporalities, as well as Eliza Chandler’s questioning of temporality, Kafer argues that crip time doesn’t refer to a quantitative determination of time.12 Rather, it’s a way of thinking about time as qualitative, embodied, and futural. Crip time refers to a queering of time. Disability is considered something one would want to correct or eradicate by assimilating disabled bodies to normative structures (here through the allocation of more time for a given task). Disability is often measured in time: extra time is calculated in quantitative terms and then allocated to the disabled person. Kafer’s insistence on thinking of “imagined futures” leads her to question what it means to create desire for something conventionally understood as undesirable. According to Fritsch, “‘to crip’ is to open up desire for what disability disrupts.”13 This involves imaging disability into the future, instead of seeing disability as tragedy to be overcome. Kafer urges us to desire crip futures without assimilation. She describes her work on desiring disability into the future, as a topic that was so inconceivable, that it was misunderstood as a science-fiction plot. She asks, what positive outcomes can we imagine for crip futurity, where ableness only sees tragedy?14 Crip time provides a framework for thinking about what, and who, is projected into the future. In keeping with the central tenets of crip time, my projects aim to foster desire for strange temporalities. The projects that make up this thesis issue from a place of lived desire; at specific junctures and points of rupture where I fail to assimilate. What happens from inhabiting these ruptures? What would it mean to explore disability in time and to articulate my own crip time? This thesis is born from a desire to enact crip theory by operating on my own crip time. What would it mean to open desire for what disability disrupts through art practice? To explore these possibilities, I developed a series of smaller projects that could be compiled over the course of a degree. I was confident that using non-traditional academic methods to complete my thesis work would not only make my education more accessible to me, but that it would be required that I develop a crip method that involved putting crip theory into relation to material art practice. What would happen if instead of trying to be accommodated into a normal master’s work structure, I was given time to be more like myself? Crip futurity is an important site to both imagine, articulate, and materialize alternative futures that anticipate a moment that has not yet arrived. My projects consider a constellation of questions: How can I sound and be more like myself? What would it mean to articulate my own time as crip time? How can I open desire to what disability disrupts? How can art practice inhabit these points of disruption and what emerges from these strategic, performative practices? My projects produce new material expressions of crip time. Art practice provides a space for non-linear exploration and speculation that doesn’t require proof to verify its findings. Encouraging dis-jointure and disjunction, art practice encourages structural experimentation and play, while recognizing failure as a form of productivity that yields no results. At the same time, I recognize that the art milieu is marked by many ableist failures of access and recognition. I understand how deeply art is rooted in histories of oppression. While mapping these histories is beyond the scope of my thesis, I want to flag these failures and violent omissions, even as I take up material and ritual art practice as a radically resistant practice of everyday living. 14 Kafer, Feminist, Queer, Crip, 2. 9 My thesis is thoroughly grounded in a crip theory framework: I am operating on my own crip time, which is specific to me. I develop a structure that facilitates the construction of my own personal rhythms and ritual practices of art making, which are also performative, in situ, durational, and quotidian practices of living. These practices aim to determine what desire for the future can look like. Crip time allows me to cultivate my own time; crip time functions as a general call to action that prompted the cultivation of routines that articulate my own crip-ness. The result is a series of “strange temporalities, imaginative life schedules, and eccentric economic practices” that refuse normative regimes and guidelines regarding productivity.15 The resulting projects that make up my thesis work push the boundaries of conventional theoretical and academic writing; they are not, as I will argue in a moment, finished products. Instead they involve the deployment of and creation of ritual practices for living; these material practices aim to create space and desire for my own living. The kind of rituals that I am interested in—the kind I intuitively desire and long for— resonate with Dominican-American novelist Junot Diaz’s description of love and resistance, which I first encountered in quotation as the epigraph to Leanne Simpson’s collection of short stories, Islands of Decolonial Love. Diaz explains that “The kind of love that I was interested in, that my characters long for intuitively, is the only kind of love that could liberate them from that horrible legacy of colonial violence.” What Diaz calls “decolonial love” is a desiring for the possibility of loving “one’s broken-by-the-coloniality-of-power self in another broken-by-the-coloniality-of-power person.”16 This desire for self-love in the aftermath of colonial violence begins by knowing what it is not. For me, this project parallels an intuitive longing, (as it does for Diaz) that does not aim for coherence, neoliberal productivity, or the homogeneity of time this productivity demands of our bodies. Decolonial love proceeds from this negative moment through an attempt to sort through what desiring of the futurity means. This desire for crip futures is born out of an empty space. As Kafer suggests, the desire to examine disability futures Is a desire born largely of absence? We lack such futures in this present, and my desires are practically inconceivable in the public sphere. There is no recognition that one could desire disability, no move to imagine what such desire could look like.17 Responding to this important acknowledgment, my aim is to define the contours of this absence but without filling this space with definitive contents. The large and broad goal then of my work is (like Diaz’s expression of decolonial love), the production of a kind of desire for futurity that can liberate the legacy of colonial violence. An impossible task. In my thesis this task is expressed through the quest for everyday practices that were not settler-colonial practices, (or practices of assimilation), but rather practices of making and creating desire. The projects that constitute this thesis attempt to engage materials that are less imbued with coloniality and institutional power—quotidian and ritual practices of living and care, object cobbling, listening and conversation (with objects and human / nonhuman others), interspecies co-habitation, collaboration etc. Each of these time-consuming, performative practices of making actively undermine conventional neoliberal structures of productivity and value. Together they articulate a paradoxical attempt to be productive in ways that undermine productivity, which I call productivity without productivity. It is not …. productivity for productivity sake It is not …. (as I learned the hard way) sitting on my ass ALL the damn day in a refusal of productivity because I will (fact) feel like a rotting pile of goo. It is not …. writing It is not …. resolute, fixed, final or finished works It is not …. assimilation It is not …. endless private labour in order to participate in conventional practice It is not …. an attempt to revive the past (ceramics) It is not …. thinking tragically about myself It is not …. participating in not useful self-care conversations It is not …. feeling bad about my leaky needs It is not …. time management, as in “have to” / “should” kind if self-structure It is not …. learning linear organizational systems; these are completely useless to me. It is not …. perfection 17 Kafer, Feminist-Queer-Crip, 45. 11 It is not …. coherence It is not …. to not write in a conventional way that makes me sound the same as everyone else It is not …. the deployment of disability as a token metaphor It is not …. Roberts Rules, or adapted Roberts Rules It is not … performing and displaying diligent productive efforts in order to get validation or support It is not … the pursuit of ‘correct’ / coherent kinds of desire, the ones that don’t interrupt business as usual ways of working and being It is … bringing desire into process differently It is … productivity without productivity It is … contributing to processes and projects that are fixed-in-transformation It is … unraveling into time-consuming works-in-progress It is … getting to know my own rhythm, rather than using self-discipline to motivate movement It is … developing modes of working that get at the heart of my own ‘voice’ (e.g., conversational or dialogic approach) It is … developing ways of collaborating that allow for being different together (that don’t require assimilation) It is… meshing i.e., collaborating with both human and nonhuman others (i.e., animals, materials, and objects) It is … trying to produce less harm as a personal practice of harm reduction It is … recognizing where I hold privilege and taking up less space by reverse privileging those who may be more venerable than me It is … using my privilege to cite the law differently It is … undermining the limitations of conventional practice and what it can and should produce It is… creating desire for what disability disrupts De-composition This practice of productivity without productivity involves making processes that are fixed-intransformation. Mobilizing what McRuer calls “de-composition,” as a methodological approach and key component of crip theory, my projects cultivate and privilege “incoherent” and unfinished 12 works and rituals.18 In Crip Theory, McRuer asks how we can labor to agitate composition. Problematizing traditional approaches to Composition Theory, McRuer argues that traditional approaches to composition tend to emphasize the reduction of difference into finished products that demonstrate compositional sameness (from the “well-made” essay to the supposedly coherent identity of the heterosexual male).19 According to McRuer, this notion of composition prioritizes formula and routinized order that simultaneously composes cultural practices of corporate efficiency and naturalized heterosexuality.20 Composition is a highly monitored cultural practice, and those doing the monitoring (on some level, all of us are involved in this process) are intent on producing order and efficiency where there was none, and, ultimately, forgetting the messy composing process and the composing bodies that experience it. In contrast, McRuer argues for a theory of “de-composition” that cultivates “desirability of a loss of composure.” 21 Placing queer theory and disability studies at the heart of composition theory, McRuer acknowledges and affirms experiences where composing is always an unruly and disorderly cultural practice—where identity is never complete or finished and is always in the process of formation and deformation.22 McRuer challenges ableist assumptions of legibility presupposed by composition theory and extends it to include forms of composition that are never complete, which are always in process. Decomposition privileges difference, rather than attempting its resolution. Engaging in a critical dialogue on composing bodies and practices of composition, McRuer theorizes a mode of composition that is also a process of de-composition, he challenges the centrality of thesis or critique, and even the importance of finishing projects: “Is it possible to resist the impulse to focus on finished products?”23 Suggesting that process is more important than product, because process encourages the formatting of new knowledge McRuer describes “de-composition” as “a process that provides an ongoing critique of both the corporate models into which we, as students and teachers of composition, are interpellated and the concomitant disciplinary compulsion to produce only dis-embodied, efficient writers.”24 Placing queer theory and disability studies at the center of composition theory allows McRuer to foreground how our identities are “shaped and reshaped” through “multiple communities and discourses—of composing, or writing into existence, a coherent and individual self.”25 Extending “de-composition” as a methodological approach for art practice and selfformation, my projects cultivate and privilege “incoherent” and unfinished works and rituals.26 My thesis projects highlight embodied elements of compositional process. My works remain unfinished. They are ongoing works. They are fixed-in-transformation. They are interlinking; they blur into one another. They are never focused on the delivery of final products. My projects are strategically openended, quotidian performative and ritual practices that develop crip-creation as a practice of everyday life.27 I use a de/compositional process that bears the traces of making, which are the foundation and heart of my thesis project. This process-based framework observes and articulates transformations: these works are constitutively unfinished. They resist closure. In other words, I have no “finished” products, no definitive production and dissemination paths are followed. Rather, my projects are engaged in a quiet refusal. Their cultivation of incoherence is a refusal of neoliberal productivity: conventions that dominate academia as much as the art world. This refusal gets folded into my method and is what I call “productivity without productivity.” Instead of forcing things to be well-composed and coherent, throughout this thesis, I attempt to create projects that are ongoing, durational, open-ended, informal and folded into my everyday life, Being productive without productivity is a method for answering this project’s larger research question about the cultivation of desire for crip futures. It is itself a method for cripping the future, and for imagining new forms of futurity that cultivate crip love. Within this incoherence however, there is always an element of coherence—we could say an incoherent coherence that involves a methodological specificity that takes different material forms of engagement depending on context.

#### Understand the AFF in contrast to the austerity of representation that upholds ableism.

McRuer, 2018 (Robert – Professor of English @ George Washington University, Crip Times: Disability, Globalization, and Resistance, p. 56-57, shae)

In what follows, I theorize austerity even more comprehensively as both an economic and a broadly cultural phenomenon or strategy. Put differently, the economic strategy of austerity in many ways requires a cultural politics that I will describe here as an austerity of representation. What Tobin Siebers calls an "ideology of ability'' has long vouchsafed flattened, nonthreatening representations of disability (7); my contention is that such deadened representations are newly put to use, in crip times, to obscure the workings of austerity. A neoliberal austerity of representation is on display throughout Crip Times, but I focus here on how that austerity of representation works to foreclose other crip possibilities, both in the sense of ruling out or preventing and in the sense of (more specifically and a bit ironically) taking possession of something that has been the property of another. A literal foreclosure in the economic sense happens when one party "fails" to meet its obligations to pay the bank; the representational foreclosure I'll put forward here is more metaphorical, but is likewise essentially a response to those who won't abide by the economic and cultural rules neoliberalism affords us (because they don't feel obliged to, or cannot). A neoliberal austerity of representation disciplines what Lauren Berlant, in a discussion of Brian Massumi, terms "unforeclosed experience" (5); it is a strategic (and ongoing) move that dilutes the power and potentiality of alternative, more radical or resistant, representations. 1 I also begin in this chapter a sustained attention to four keywords for the crip times we inhabit: dispossession, resistance, displacement, and aspiration. Dispossession is the focus of the current chapter, and is a keyword that my introduction of a neoliberal "foreclosure" should already anticipate. The activism spotlighted in this chapter and the next aspires to work against, with, and (perhaps most importantly) through a multivalent politics of dispossession that is a necessary component of austerity. David Harvey names neoliberal processes that centralize wealth through privatization and through redistribution of resources away from the public "accumulation by dispossession" (New 137). In Harvey's terms, the global austerity politics that escalates super-exploitation of workers globally and protects capitalists while slashing services to the poor would be a clear example of such accumulation by dispossession: wealth is redistributed to/accumulated by those at the top while those at the bottom are dispossessed of resources, public services, or secure networks of care. Without question, we should oppose such neoliberal dispossession -the form of dispossession upon which austerity depends. The varied forms of crip activism I pivot toward in this chapter and the next, however, to draw on Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou, allow us "to formulate a theory of political performativity" that might materialize contingent and desirable versions of dispossession that counter the dominant (and quotidian) forms of dispossession that should be resisted (ix-x). The versions of dispossession that Butler and Athanasiou invoke, writing in their own joint conversation literally titled Dispossession, take us out of ourselves in ways that allow for political action with others.

#### Only the AFF’s study of disability can expose purging under capitalism and create successful resistance to capitalist structures through crip collectivity.

McRuer, 2018 (Robert – Professor of English @ George Washington University, Crip Times: Disability, Globalization, and Resistance, p. 13-35, shae)

Most studies of austerity, however, have noted neither disability's centrality to a global austerity politics nor the nuanced ways, as in Spain, that disability might serve as a site from which to understand and resist that politics. Mark Blyth's important book Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea makes no mention of disability, and even David Stuckler and Sanjay Basu's The Body Economic: Why Austerity Kills, while focusing on public health in various locations, and opening with very personal illness narratives, has no entry for "disability" in the index. 6 Crip Times thus in many ways simply aims to make explicit and central what is implicit and peripheral in other studies. The project "crips" contemporary capitalist globalization, or more precisely, crips the global economic crisis that is largely offered up as justification for the austerity we are now enduring and which does not promise to go away any time soon. Crip Times crips this crisis by specifically adding crip and queer perspectives to studies that are seeking to analyze the cultural logic of neoliberalism and the austerity that is now part and parcel of it. Analyzing the "cultural logic of neoliberalism" more generally, simply entails asking how cultural formations and movements circulate around, emerge from, and resist the hegemonic global political economy of neoliberal capitalism. 7 "Creeping privatization'' and "crippling austerity" are phrases that currently travel rather freely through global media (although not necessarily or consistently through the mainstream media); "cripping austerity" (my subheading in this section, and a phrase I have often used during the completion of this book to describe its central aim), not so much. 8 Indeed, I have sometimes been "corrected" by interlocutors hearing me use crip as a verb to describe an action that might be performed upon austerity. "Surely when you said 'cripping austerity; you meant 'crippling austerity;" one writer from the right-wing Heritage Foundation informed me condescendingly. It's not a misunderstanding that bothers me particularly (although members of the Heritage Foundation are definitely not the presumed audience for this book), as I do believe it's useful to imagine that we are living in what I will call crip times, and I welcome the opportunity to think about what that might mean and to translate some of the edgy and powerful valences of crip (as noun, verb, and adjective) to readers or listeners unfamiliar with the term. Crip Times is obviously concerned from start to finish with disability (even as it hopes to open up capaciously the many generative ways the term disability has functioned or might function). Nonetheless, some discussion of the other central terms of my analysis ( on a basic level, neoliberalism and austerity, but even more importantly, crip and crip times) is important at the outset, particularly for readers outside crip culture, disability activism, or the interdisciplinary field of disability studies. I define my key terms in the remainder of this section before decidedly pivoting, in the remaining sections of this Introduction, to the UK. Neoliberalism Neoliberalism has been the dominant political economy since the 1980s; the architects of neoliberalism emphasized both the centrality of an unencumbered "free" market and the state's complex role in vouchsafing that centrality. The neoliberal state is often imagined, or positioned rhetorically, as a small, supposedly noninterventionist and nonregulatory state, but as Richard Seymour quite rightly explains, and as my Spanish examples from 2011 underscore, "the neoliberal state is a big interventionist state;' especially in its penal, police, or military forms; the neoliberal state, as Seymour puts it in his important study Against Austerity: How We Can Fix the Crisis They Made, "is ever more involved in organising corporate dominance" (10, 11). In Chile under Augusto Pinochet (followed quickly by other repressive regimes in the Southern Cone), in the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher, and in the United States under Ronald Reagan, neoliberalism was consolidated and slowly globalized through the state-driven privatization and deregulation of forces that would block the sacrosanct "free flow" of capital. In the process, the state was indeed, in one very specific sense, downsized through profound cuts to public social services, but it has been, in some ways paradoxically, deeply interventionist states around the globe that have managed that downsizing. Especially in Chile and the Southern Cone, the consolidation of new regimes of private property and the control of vibrant, democratic public cultures were often secured through violence, repression, and the literal, state-sanctioned disappearance of dissidents. Naomi Klein, in her landmark book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, argues more generally that the engineers of neoliberalism have consistently relied on or actively deployed "shock" to push their ideas through. Klein looks to both "natural" and human -made disasters in The Shock Doctrine, recognizing of course that even "natural" disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in 2004 are simultaneously "human made" in many ways ( through callous disregard for the environment, through neglect of infrastructure, through underfunding of state-supported emergency services, and so forth). The point for Klein is that not only military coups and wars, but also earthquakes and hurricanes, and of course economic "crises;' have provided both a shock and a "blank slate" for imposing usually quite unpopular ideas on suffering populations already reeling from the disaster at hand. For example, after the violent September 11, 1973 coup that brought Pinochet to power (and that deposed and drove to suicide the democratically elected president Salvador Allende), Klein writes that the University of Chicago-trained economists ("Chicago boys") around Pinochet were experiencing "giddy anticipation and deadline adrenaline" (94). The coup and its aftermath were to provide, finally, a laboratory for putting into place the ideas of economist Milton Friedman that they held sacred: "privatization, deregulation and cuts to social spending-the free-market trinity" (94). Similar giddy anticipation would erupt repeatedly among the power brokers of neoliberalism following countless shocks around the world over the next four decades. Neoliberalism institutes "flexible" production, or ''just in time" production, that is often outsourced to locations with cheaper labor costs, usually in the Global South. Having resources for production "just in time" means that the materials needed for production are never (inefficiently) stockpiled; the demand for products in various locations, moreover, is assessed more continuously and rigorously to avoid overproduction. David Harvey explains that the" 'just-in-time' principle ... minimises the cost of idle inventories": "producers deal with suppliers directly and, with optimal scheduling and supply models, transmit orders for components directly back down their supply chain" (Enigma 68). The flexible efficiency of this globalized model of production stands in stark contrast to the Fordist mass production of the mid-twentieth century, which (with its innovative factories) was efficient in its moment but depended upon less than "optimal" forms of communication and delivery to and from its assembly lines. This efficiency of production has been coupled with an "efficiency" of sorts, of consumption; in and through its flexibility and speed, as neoliberalism has congealed, it has relied on or produced "new forms of niche consumerism" (Harvey, Enigma 131), constructing or hypostasizing target markets or identities - particular, defined groups to whom a streamlined "just-in-time" production could cater. 9 Niche consumerism is one of the ways in which individualism has been reinvented or repackaged for our times (consumption, in other words, has been hyper-individualized). The other dominant way in which individualism has been repackaged is more obviously punitive, as neoliberalism depends not only upon fetishized notions of consumer "choice" but also upon related notions of "personal responsibility" (Duggan, Twilight 12). The neoliberal mandate for "personal responsibility" implicitly calls for and explicitly generates a constant monitoring of both self and others. Lisa Duggan writes that "social service functions are privatized through personal responsibility as the proper functions of the state are narrowed, tax and wage costs in the economy are cut, and more social costs are absorbed by civil society and the family" (Twilight 15-16). Rhetorics of personal responsibility, perhaps unsurprisingly, have been particularly pronounced in the United States, but they are increasingly central in other locations such as Britain. Austerity Despite its different valences in different locations, contemporary austerity is a response to the crises of twenty-first century neoliberal capitalism, and is in many ways simply neoliberalism intensified, even as the fantasy of consumer choice is positioned as out of reach for more and more people. Like neoliberalism more generally, austerity is characterized by a lowering of government spending, an increasing of labor hours for workers (hence, the raising of the retirement age in Spain), cuts to benefits and social services, and-wherever possible – privatization of those social services. All these measures, in the age of austerity, are imposed to again spur capitalist growth that has stalled and to protect thereby the profits of capitalists through the crises. Austerity is generally wrapped up in rhetorics of emergency, whether the topic is reducing a national debt, paying for an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan, or protecting banks from catastrophic loss. The supposed need for "emergency" austerity measures in so many locations was so pronounced in the years after 2008, that National Public Radio in the United States (now simply called "NPR") reported that austerity had been named word of the year in 2010 by Merriam-Webster's dictionary. NPR has itself since been a victim of austerity politics, as its budget has been slashed, a range of diverse programming cut, and staff reduced ( Goldstein; Carney). 10 Like Klein in her general overview of disaster capitalism, Mark Blyth-in his own history of what the subtitle of his book terms that "dangerous idea;' austerity-focuses on multiple locations, noting at the current moment that "German ideals of fiscal prudence clash with Spanish unemployment at 25 percent and a Greek state ... slashing itself to insolvency and mass poverty while being given ever-more loans to do so" (2). The United States, meanwhile, has been marked by "a hollowing out of middle-class opportunities, and a gridlocked state" that, despite its gridlock ( which might suggest fractures in a consensus), has generally not advanced alternatives to the economic order that has been dominant for more than three decades (2). "If we view each of these elements in isolation, it all looks rather chaotic;' Blyth writes, but "what they have in common is their supposed cure: austerity, the policy of cutting the state's budget to promote growth" (2). Ongoing loans for Greece have come on the condition that harsher and harsher cuts be imposed on citizens (even though the Greek population voted overwhelmingly in 2015 to reject those conditions); the gridlocked state in the United States has often resulted from Republican refusals to act until more austere budgets are pushed through the legislature; and so forth. Post-2008, austerity has been the ubiquitous neoliberal cure for the global economic crisis. Even if a consensus that austerity does not actually work is legible in many economic analyses and (clearly) in popular opinion, in most locations some form of austerity politics is still nonetheless put forward as "common sense" across the mainstream political spectrum. 11 This seeming-consensus has certainly been evident for more than thirty years in the United States, with the Democrats and the Republicans, but also until recently in Spain, with the PSEO' and the PP; it is evident, as we shall see, in the UK, with the Conservative (Tory) Party on one side, and "New Labour" as it emerged at the turn of the century under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown on the other. That consensus has shown multiple fractures over the course of writing this book, with emergent parties of the Left (Syriza for a time in Greece, Podemos in Spain) or the left wing of the Labour and Democratic parties in the United Kingdom and the United States openly, if very unevenly, critiquing the consensus around austerity and imagining alternatives.12 However, given how thoroughly austerity has succeeded as what Richard Seymour rightly calls a "class strategy;' it is not likely "that the Left will be able to simply stop austerity in its tracks, and immediately reverse its successes thus far" (Against 29, 152). As a transnational class strategy responding to the global crisis, austerity has served well as the pretext for managing "crisis:' and it has had as its effect the ongoing (and indeed astronomical) upward redistribution of wealth. Following the September 2015 election, by party members, of the socialist Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party in the UK (and thus as the official leader of the opposition party), the editors of Salvage: A New Quarterly of Revolutionary Arts and Letters (including Seymour), observing that class strategy suddenly thrown into sharp relief through Corbyn's challenge to the New Labour consensus, wrote that the struggle against austerity, and neoliberal capitalism more generally, "will refract through its own institutional and ideological character the conflict that cleaves society as a whole, that between exploiter and exploited, between oppressor and oppressed. And the odds in that conflict remain stacked heavily in favour of the habitual victors" ("Pessimism"). Although Crip Times turns repeatedly toward generative activist and artistic responses from 2011 forward, to a global austerity politics, I share Seymour's (and his coeditors') caution and pessimism about the ease with which austerity might be countered, given the immense political and economic power of those who would sustain it and who have profited immensely from its implementation, regardless of whether it has "succeeded" or "failed" ( on its own ostensible terms) as an economic strategy. 13 Crip Austerity bites, as one recent title out of the UK would have it; Mary O'Hara's Austerity Bites details stories of the current hardship faced by poor and working-class populations in the country.14 Partly because of that bite, however, austerity is probably the most readily accessible (and widely disseminated) keyword in my study. The terms crip, or cripping, however, as I suggested, could use more framing. In some ways, like queer, crip as a noun has had a variegated history. Crip has clearly been a derogatory term (derived in English again, from the word cripple) and will always, I contend, carry traces of a painful history of stigma and derision. Crip has, however, in the face of this, been a term that has been reclaimed by many disabled people and groups themselves. Even more than disability itself (which also has been reclaimed and resignified to mean something different from, or in excess of, lack or loss), crip has functioned for many as a marker of an in-your-face, or out-and-proud, cultural model of disability. As Snyder and Mitchell explain, a cultural model of disability recognizes "disability as a site of phenomenological value that is not purely synonymous with the processes of social disablement" (Cultural 5). Given that disabled people themselves have done the labor of resignifying crip, crip is not opposed to disability (far from it; crip arguably revels in disability). Crip does, however, generally stand in opposition to both the medical model, which would reduce disability to the univocality of pathology, diagnosis, or treatment/elimination, and to some forms of the well-known social model, largely developed in the UK, which suggest that disability should be understood as located not in bodies per se but in inaccessible environments requiring adaptation. Crip's excessive, flamboyant defiance ties it to models of disability (and to uses of the term disability) that are more culturally generative (and politically radical) than a merely reformist social model. Although the historical connections of crip to cripple seem to tie the term to mobility impairment, it has actually proven to be far stretchier. A recent set of two special issues of the Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, coedited by Merri Lisa Johnson and me and focusing on "Cripistemologies" (a term coined by Johnson), positions crip as describing well what we might see as non-normative or nonrepresentative disabilities-disabilities, shall we say, that would never be legible beneath the universal access symbol for disability. Several essays included focus on what Anna Mollow terms "undocumented disabilities" ("Criphystemologies" 185); others focus specifically on borderline personality, anxiety, chronic pain, HIV/ AIDS, trans identity, and a range of other forms of embodiment or impairments at times not always adequately or easily comprehended by the signifier disability. Likewise, throughout her important study Feminist, Queer, Crip, Alison Kafer at times uses the term to think carefully about issues, mental states, behaviors, or forms of embodiment that might not, on the surface, appear to be about disability at all. For Kafer and others, crip has the capacity to encompass forms of embodiment or states of mind that are arguably in excess of the able-minded or able-bodied/disabled binary. Not unlike queer at its most radical, crip often has the fabulous potential to be simultaneously flamboyantly identitarian ( as in, we are crip and you will acknowledge that!) and flamboyantly anti-identitarian (as in, we reject your categories or the capacity of languages saturated in ableism to describe us!).15 As my use of "we" here suggests, and as Kafer's study explicitly affirms throughout, the politics of crip have generally been actively collective or coalitional. There have certainly been necessary debates about the limited or situated value of the word. I myself sought to encourage such debates when, in 2006 in Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability, I listed a range of terms that have performed similar critical work and insisted that crip should be "permanently and desirably contingent: in other queer, crip, and queercrip contexts, squint-eyed, half dead, not dead yet, gimp, freak, crazy, mad, or diseased pariah have served, or might serve, similar generative functions .... Crip is a critical term [that] in various times and places must be displaced by other terms" (40, 41). Both Crip Theory and Feminist, Queer, Crip-as this list of varied, contingent, and shifting queercrip contexts hopefully affirms-situate crip itself as generally emergent from activist and artistic cultural locations of disability, even as it has been taken up at this point in a wide range of transnational academic locations ( which can, of course, themselves be activist and/ or artistic). Eli Clare is one artist and activist who has written thoughtfully about crip; in Exile and Pride: Disability, Queerness, and Liberation, Clare explicitly uses the first-person plural to explain how "we in the disability rights movement create crip culture, tell crip jokes, identify a sensibility we call crip humor" (68). For Clare, creative deployments of crip differentiate it from the more individualistic supercrip. Supercrips have often been critiqued for participating in ableist "overcoming" narratives, as though disability represented an adversity over which one must "triumph" (through athletic competition or daring adventures, for example).16 Clare appeared with numerous other disabled artists in Mitchell and Snyder's groundbreaking 1995 documentary Vital Signs: Crip Culture Talks Back, with the very title suggesting that crip is connected to disability community, solidarity, outspokenness, and defiance. Crip, in all these senses, has not been limited to the United States; in the UK the cartoonist Crippen has generated biting critiques of both ableist ideas generally and austerity in particular, and performer Liz Carr has created "crip radio" through a podcast called "Ouch!" available on the BBC's disability website. In Australia, comedienne and disability activist Stella Young produced a comedy performance called "Tales from the Crip" aimed at affirming disabled people's sexuality while mocking ableist notions that disabled people should be "inspirational" (she even wore a T-shirt that read "Inspiration Boner Killer"). "I identify with the crip community;' Young said in a 2012 interview, "I didn't invent the word it's a political ideology I came to in my late teens and early 20s. People often say to me 'You can't say that!' and I say, 'Well, my people have been saying it for decades so I reckon I probably can'" (Northover). Back in the United States, Mike Ervin has blogged as "Smart Ass Cripple" since 2010 on the "official site for bitter cripples (and those who love them):' Leroy Moore has invented an African American, disabled, and genderqueer cultural form called Krip-Hop-with the K, for Moore, marking a distance from the C of the Los Angeles-based gang called the Crips. Aiming to bring hip-hop artists and poets with disabilities to a wider audience, Krip-Hop has been integrated into some of the performances of Sins Invalid, a troupe celebrating the beauty, desirability, and diversity of queer and disabled people of color. Usage of the term as an adjective in cases such as these underscores its generative character: when combined with a noun ( crip community, crip culture, Krip-Hop ), "crip" as adjective is not simply additive. Describing something like culture as "crip" remakes the substance in question: "crip culture" is not simply crip + culture ( as if we all agreed in advance what the latter term might mean). In the same ways that "crip" as noun does not simplistically mark a form of existence that can be known in advance, "crip" as adjective cannot be reduced to a mere descriptor. The term's power when used as a verb in turn emanates from its uses as a noun or adjective. Queer disability theorist Mel Y. Chen has written about "animacy;' which he describes as the degree of "liveness" associated with an entity or term. Animacy hierarchies, for Chen, have generally fixed, or deadened, that which has been understood as queer or disabled. For Chen, "a queer-crip approach to disability" is marked, in contrast, by an enlivening or "disentangling of the discourses ... that contain and fix dis/abled bodies" (215). Whether as noun, adjective, or verb, crip has participated in what Chen identifies as "reworldings that challenge the order of things" (237). To crip or not to crip is not the question for many writers, artists, and activists as the crip times I describe below demand action. We are, however, still collectively discovering what it might or can mean "to crip" and, as a verb, the term is still perhaps best defined by what it might potentially become (as a process) than by what it is. Two important conferences in Prague, the Czech Republic, that postdate the global economic crisis-Cripping Neoliberalism in 2010 and Cripping Development in 2013-implied in their titles that cripping entails radically revisioning, from committed anti-ableist positions, the taken-for-granted systems in which we are located. "Cripping Neoliberalism" and "Cripping Development" interrogated fetishized notions of capitalist growth and highlighted how bodies and minds are unevenly caught up in, or differentially materialize around, global processes of uneven development. The location of the 2010 and 2013 conferences outside the United States or western Europe notably indicated a desire to find new languages useful for thinking about disability and impairment in the Global South or postsocialist countries. 17 Crip and cripping can certainly be positioned alongside a range of terms that represent the need for new or multiple languages for thinking about disability. For some scholars, such as Julie Livingston and Jasbir K. Puar, debility has played a key role in the development of new, critical vocabularies. Debility is useful, in particular, for Livingston's work in Botswana, where no word translates easily into "disability;' but where a concept is nonetheless needed for encompassing a range of "experiences of chronic illness and senescence, as well as disability per se" (113). I am very sympathetic to this work, and debility arguably describes well many of the bodily experiences I consider in the pages ahead. Puar, however, often explicitly offers up debility as part of a supersession narrative, or what she describes as "a move from disability to debility" ("Prognosis" 166).18 Crip and cripping, in contrast, do not assume in advance that disability, especially as it is worked on and across by artists and activists and not just by state and capital, is always and everywhere exhausted. Crip has crossed some borders relatively easily and has, at this point, moved in and out of various languages. One of the first special issues of an academic journal on crip theory ( titled Cripteori) was a bilingual (English and Swedish) special issue out of Scandinavia; the issue carefully examined both the multiple and always contested ways in which the term had been taken up by a range of subjects in Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland. The activist, anticapitalist newspaper or zine Crip Magazine, out of Vienna, Austria, was also bilingual (English and German). Crip resonates strongly with some radical queer and disability activists in Spanish-speaking and German-speaking locations generally (in German, the contemporary history of crip partially intersects with the longer history of the Kruppel Movement, although the ways in which the term currently travels in German-speaking locations, perhaps especially in connection to radical groups in Vienna, seems to me to be semiautonomous from that movement). 19 In Spain, Moscoso Perez and others have begun to talk about "cripwashing" as a complicated process of state control or domestication of disability liberation, using the very language of disability activism (170 ). "La teoria crip;' Lucas Platero suggests, is potentially translated as "literalmente teoria tullida'' ("Politicas" 11); in Spanish contexts, la teoria tullida or crip has been used as a tool for naming or exposing neoliberal appropriations of radical visions of disability activism and coalition. 20 Theorizing similar appropriations in a Czech context, Katerina Kolafova uses the idea of "the inarticulate post-socialist crip" to describe impaired or disabled ( and socialist) modes of being that have been silenced by celebratory neoliberal uses of disability during the transition to capitalism in eastern Europe (257). "To crip;' like "to queer;' gets at processes that unsettle, or processes that make strange or twisted. 21 Cripping also exposes the ways in which able-bodiedness and able-mindedness get naturalized and the ways that bodies, minds, and impairments that should be at the absolute center of a space or issue or discussion get purged from that space or issue or discussion. Such purging has tended to be in the service of the smooth functioning of a globalized neoliberal capitalism, which is (as should be clear from my Spanish and Czech examples above) one reason why the term has had such resonance with more radical disabled activists (since it exposes or disrupts that smooth functioning). Cripping always attends to the materiality of embodiment at the same time that it attends to how spaces, issues, or discussions get "straightened:' The critical act of cripping, I argue, resists "straightening" in a rather more expansive sense than we might think of straightening, at the moment, in queer studies, activism, or art. This is in part because the radical power of queer has been diluted by global commodification processes that have not (yet) domesticated crip or contained and commodified what Mia Mingus terms "crip solidarity" ("Wherever You Are"). For disability radicals, crip is a keyword that currently connects to what queer of color and crip of color theorists such as Mingus have begun to call "disability justice" ("Changing"). Disability justice moves beyond mere rights-based and nation-state-based strategies (represented most prominently by the Americans with Disabilities Act). It also forges antineoliberal coalitions in the interests of a global crip imagination, which can invent new ways of countering oppression and generate new forms of being-in-common. Crip Britain Crip Times, the book, as I have indicated, largely centers on one location, the UK. It repeatedly spins out, however, to other places as it traces both the globalization and resistance of my subtitle. For many disabled people living there, the UK has certainly felt like ground zero for austerity since the early 2000s. Crip times, the concept, thus attempts to capture what has been happening, during that time, in the UK. Some readers will note echoes of "New Times" in my title; those echoes are deliberate.22 "New Times" was a phrase used by Stuart Hall, Martin Jacques, and other cultural studies writers associated with the journal Marxism Today in the 1980s. Jacques edited Marxism Today between 1977 and 1991, when the journal stopped publication. A volume called New Times, collecting a series of articles published in Marxism Today and selected other pieces (including, importantly, critiques), was published in 1989 and was edited by Hall and Jacques. Some of the articles in the volume had first appeared in a special issue of Marxism Today pubIished in late 1988. During its existence, Marxism Today was the official journal of the Communist Party of Great Britain, although during the time of Jacques's editorship, contributions ( and readership) came from the Left more broadly, including eventually the liberal or center-Left that would become associated with New Labour. Many of the pieces associated with the special issue and the 1989 collection emerged from direct conversations held in May 1988, as the writers gathered to make sense of contemporary Britain. In the New Times volume and special issue, writers exploring the concept of "New Times" were attempting to account for shifts in the economic, political, cultural, and critical landscape under Thatcherism ( a term coined by Hall himself), although they were also attempting to think beyond Thatcherism (Hall, "Great Moving" 14). Thatcherism and neoliberalism more broadly were positioned as phenomena marking a decisive shift, a new hegemonic formation, and the writers in New Times were interested in theorizing how popular consent to that formation had been secured. Hall himself considered various ways that the shift was being described (" 'post-industrial; 'post-Fordist; 'revolution of the subject; 'postmodernism "), recognizing at the time that none of these terms was "wholly satisfactory" for describing what was taking place ("Meaning" 117). The Labour Party had faced dramatic losses in 1983, as Thatcher was reelected, although Klein (and others) would later argue that the manufactured "shock'' of the Falklands War altered Thatcher's fortunes and allowed her to continue pushing through unpopular ideas and policies (in particular, defeating striking mine workers in the two years that followed the general election) (Klein 163-176). A critique of Labour Party politics in the UK, and of a politics focused solely on class and located largely with labor unions, emerged from this turbulent period and was a component of the New Times debates and anthology; Hall, Rosalind Brunt, and others were emphatic that the Left needed to account more actively for the changes wrought by "the politics of identity" (Brunt 150) and a wide variety of social movements (feminism most specifically, but also movements focused on race, sexuality, and the environment). Disability as such (as a substantive entity that, even potentially, might be part of these new social movements) is only mentioned a handful of times in the 463-page volume. David Marquand points out that post-Fordism has generated a "growing underclass of the handicapped and unskilled" (374). Beatrix Campbell, interviewing a range of people across the UK living in what she calls "New Times Towns" (279), mentions "disabled access" as part of a changing urban landscape and specifically identifies Chris Sharp, who ran the Pinehurst Training Initiative in Swindon and advised business owners there on "facilities for the disabled" (292,294). Geoff Mulgan, in another essay on the changing face of cities, suggests that new communications infrastructures allow for new forms of communication, such as "teleshopping for the old and disabled" (267); a page later, he notes that city cards ( allowing access to various urban spaces) allow for "discounts to the unemployed, pensioners or the disabled" (268). Sarah Benton gestures somewhat vaguely toward actual "movements" formed by "those disabled by injury, illness, or addiction'' (343). Earlier in the volume, Robin Murray calls for new spatial organizations and "designs that take into account those needs which have no power in the market (like those of the disabled)" ( 61) and Charlie Leadbeater mentions "responsibilities to the poor and sick" (144). The latter two comments in particular identify "the disabled" in passing as subjects of concern in New Times, but in doing so, unintentionally imply that the disabled cannot really be subjects in their own right. The very grammar of these phrases, positioning disability and sickness as objects of prepositional phrases, underscores the illegibility of disability subjectivity in New Times. In general, "disability" only appears in the New Times collection occasionally as a negative metaphor. Leadbeater, for instance, later suggests that, despite the changes that might be associated with New Times, nothing "disables the Left from having a powerful and coherent critique of Thatcherite individualism" (144). Other writers, including Hall himself, at the time and later, likewise considered how various elements of New Times might or might not "disable" the Left: "The conventional culture and discourses of the Left, with its stress on 'objective contradictions; 'impersonal structures' and processes that work 'behind men's (sic) backs; have disabled us from confronting the subjective dimension in politics in any very coherent way" ("Meaning" 120). Hall's sic in relation to "conventional" discourses of the Left is particularly ironic in this passage, calling attention to the ways in which our languages are always saturated in masculinism immediately before deploying language inescapably saturated in ableism. The cosmopolitan knowingness of sic erat scrip tum, "thus was it written'' (even if, of course, we would never write it that way), colludes in blocking access, in New Times, to new ways of knowing (and knowing with) disability. Disability, however, is arguably present on a spectral theoretical level, as Brunt, Hall, and others turn to the writings of (disabled) Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci to develop a vocabulary adequate to the moment. "Unless and until we have an adequate recognition of the ways identities work;' Brunt wrote, "we are not going to be effective at world-changing. Antonio Gramsci, the pre-war Italian communist leader, was particularly acute on this point, as on many others, of how to make a politics that was subjectively relevant" (153). It did not occur to the New Times writers (or most other commentators since) that Gramsci's disability (a curved spine and diminutive stature) might have influenced his insights into the role of identity in shaping and reshaping hegemonic cultural formations, despite the fact that Brunt points out that he was developing a different revolutionary vocabulary based on what he called "a critical awareness" that took as its first injunction the ancient Delphic wisdom, "Know thyself.' Gramsci's point was that if revolutionaries were to develop a clear and coherent conception of the world they wanted to change they should make a start by asking how people experienced the world as it was, how they got by and coped with it on a daily basis. (153-154) Anne Finger, Tom Coogan, and a few others have since begun the process of thinking through, in ways New Times writers did not, Gramsci's relevance for disability studies (and I will engage Finger's work momentarily, as well as in the Epilogue to Crip Times).23 New Times writers perhaps most controversially attempted to theorize not just relations of production but of consumption and choice, working to find languages that did not simply see consumers as duped by ideology but as actively participating in forging cultural forms and shaping identities through their consumer choices. This was controversial because, even though Hall and others were trying to open up a generative "gap, analytically, between Thatcherism and new times;' they were still taking some of the changes under Thatcherism ( or aspects of Thatcherism) very seriously in order to ask whether "it may become possible to resume or re-stage the broken dialogue between socialism and modernity" (Hall, "Meaning" 127). According to many critics, then, the New Times thinkers appeared to be too captivated by the power, popularity, and spectacle of Thatcherism; their effort to discern new ways of thinking, these critics suggest, prepared the way for Blair and New Labour (and by analogy on the other side of the Atlantic, for New Democrats and Bill Clinton). Prior to his own ascension to power, Blair himself wrote a piece for Marxism Today. Mulgan would later work as an adviser to Brown. After their losses in 1983, the British Labour Party did not win a general election until Tony Blair's victory in 1997. "New Labour;' however, was a descriptor first used to describe a reinvented party in 1994, and a manifesto of New Labour's positions was published in 1996, with the title New Labour, New Life for Britain. The manifesto reflected the party's new commitment to the "third way" politics legible in other locations. This politics was dubbed "third way" because it supposedly reconciled right wing economic policies with more liberal social policies; third way thinking defined both Labour under Blair and Brown and the US Democratic Party under Clinton. As Lisa Duggan and others have shown clearly, " 'third way' parties and leaders labored to combine pro-market, pro-business, 'free trade' national and global policies with shrunken remnants of the social democratic and social justice programs of Western welfare states" (Twilight 9-10 ). The "third way" politics of New Labour and of Clintonism really only continued neoliberalism in new guises, often in guises that appeared to validate or celebrate "difference'' and diversity. For his part, Hall was quick to distance himself from the "change" Tony Blair and New Labour represented in the UK, and Hall's own cultural studies effort to develop new vocabularies for thinking about the transition, "from one regime of accumulation to another, within capitalism, whose impact has been extraordinarily wide-ranging" (Hall, "Meaning" 127), can hardly be blamed for the rise of third way thinking. Still, some New Times writers (such as Mulgan) were more directly implicated in the rise of third way thinking and (by extension) the dissolution of a rigorous analysis of class in Britain. Jacques himself expressed some enthusiasm at the moment of Blair's emergence, but even before he became prime minister, Hall and Jacques had published an article arguing that "Blair embodies the ultimate pessimism-that there is only one version of modernity, the one elaborated by the Conservatives over the last 18 years" (qtd. in Harris). The journal returned for one issue in 1998 to denounce "the Blair project:' with a cover picturing Blair with the word "Wrong" written below his face (Harris). Crip Times looks back to this history to look forward; I intend the title to signify in at least three ways. First, given the traces of pain and stigma that, as I indicated, crip always and inevitably carries, "crip times" can hardly convey any straightforward or simplistic cheeriness about the possibilities before us. I would argue, against some of its critics, that "new times" also was not simplistically optimistic (indeed, Hall and Jacques explicitly said as much in their Introduction [17]), while conceding that optimism is nonetheless more obviously or inescapably written on the surface of the "new times" 1980s phrase. "Crip times:' in contrast, are obviously harsh times, even-we might add-virtually Dickensian "hard times:' and my title thus in some ways allows me to have it both ways, agreeing with New Times theorists that a new and decisive shift has taken place with the emergence of neoliberal capitalism while also recognizing and partially agreeing with other contemporary Marxist thinkers who want to foreground not a shift but rather the deep similarities between our moment and say, the worst ravages of industrial capitalism in Victorian England. 24 Second, nonetheless, "crip times" sustains and extends the insistence that we must think about what Hall terms the revolution of the subject-extending that insistence, in particular, given that, as I suggested, disabled subjectivities, experiences, and social movements were not obviously central to the New Times project (and even though, significantly, radical AIDS activism on both sides of the Atlantic was coming into its own, and Hall himself would write a few years later about how the HIV/ AIDS pandemic was one reason why we so desperately needed the work that cultural theory and cultural studies could do) ("Cultural Studies" 272-273). Finally, "crip times" does mark, in and through the harsh and austere moment we inhabit, promise and possibility. To adapt the words of crip artist Riva Lehrer (as she describes "these people I'm falling in love with"), a group of "really amazing crips" has materialized since the late twentieth century ( qtd. in Snyder and Mitchell, Self-Preservation). To judge by the sheer amount of cultural production and consciousness they have generated, these really amazing crips are arguably a collectivity that had not existed before in exactly the same way. That crip collectivity is now being (transnationally) radicalized by austerity, and collectively generating resistance to the inadequate resolutions to economic, political, and social “crises" proferred by the guardians of neoliberalism, or by any single state. I contend that the paradoxical ways in which “crip times" carries both harshness and potentiality, along with the simple fact that the crip radicalization traced in this book is the direct result of an age of austerity, should demand a consistent focus on both ((identity" (in its complex and ever-shifting valences) and on the class dynamics and analysis that critics of New Times worried was in danger of being lost. In many ways, although the chapters ahead have many layers, my theses in Crip Times are relatively straightforward and, I hope, consistent across the cultural locations of disability I survey in this book. Disability, as I have suggested, is one of the undertheorized central issues of a global austerity politics. Surveying the ways in which activists and artists are responding to crip times, I contend that crips themselves are globally putting forward this thesis about disability's centrality and that, in some locations, their demand for disability justice is starting to register. Disability in our neoliberal moment, however, simultaneously exists as never before as a niche, an identity, even a market that is potentially quite useful (in varied ways that I will detail) to the guardians of austerity politics. Disability, in that dangerous situation, has some circumscribed potential to go the way of a globalized, commodified queerness, even if, as I have intimated, disability and crip both retain in our moment a certain critical possibility or promise not always palpable (any more, or as much) around queer. Finally, the path that cripping takes (that is, which way “disability" pivots in this dangerous moment) is wrapped up in affect, or rather a vacillation between the politics of affect (deployed quite effectively by state and capital to sustain the class strategy of austerity) and what Jasbir K. Puar and others have theorized as affective politics (Terrorist 215). Deborah Gould uses “the term affect to indicate nonconscious and unnamed, but nevertheless registered, experiences of bodily energy and intensity that arise in response to stimuli impinging on the body" (19). Affect in social movements, Gould argues, is indicative of potentiality; ((affective states can shake one out of deeply grooved patterns of thinking and feeling and allow for new imaginings" (27). A crip affective politics is discernible, I will argue in this book, in and through various forms of excessive and flamboyant, activist and artistic, crip resistance. What has been happening since 2010 in the UK (and in the Eurozone) is in many ways not necessarily new, even if it is legible as a reaction to a new (post-2008) crisis in neoliberal capitalism. The cure for the current crisis in the United States and the UK, as well as in countries across Europe, is akin to the "structural adjustment" policies imposed on heavily indebted poor countries in the Global South by global financial institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank (with centers of power in the United States and western Europe) since the 1970s. Austerity in the UK, and elsewhere in Europe and North America, in a way thus represents crip times coming home to roost, as it were. From 2010 to 2015 in the UK, austerity was implemented by a coalition government, the first to exist in Britain since World War II. In the 2010 general election, the Conservative Party, led by David Cam - eron, did not receive enough seats in Parliament for an outright majority and during five days of negotiations in May 2010, it was not entirely clear that a new government could be formed. Although the centrist Liberal Democrats, under the leadership of Nick Clegg, had prior to the 2010 elections appeared to favor a rather different political and economic agenda, they agreed to enter into a coalition government with the Tories. After his loss, Gordon Brown, the New Labour leader who had been prime minister since 2007, resigned from that position a day after resigning as Labour Party leader. In the new coalition government, Cameron became prime minister and Clegg, deputy prime minister. Ed Miliband was subsequently elected as the new Labour Party leader. Soon after the formation of the coalition, the Tories embarked on one of the most intense austerity agendas in the world, ostensibly to address the immense budget deficit that had been generated in Britain by the global economic crisis. Cameron appointed George Osborne as his chancellor of the exchequer (akin to the secretary of the treasury in the United States); Osborne would become one of the primary architects of the Tory-Liberal Democrat austerity plan. Iain Duncan Smith was appointed the secretary of state for work and pensions; Smith would execute the austerity plan by "reforming" welfare benefits in the UK. Although the coalition claimed repeatedly after 2010 that it did not plan to privatize the wildly popular British National Health Service (NHS), many commentators found this claim to be absolutely specious, as more and more elements of the NHS were altered, outsourced, or trimmed. The Health and Social Care Act of 2012 allowed for a dramatic restructuring of the NHS, devolving what had been organized by public Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to local Clinical Commissioning Groups ( CC Gs). The CCGs would be responsible for deciding how health care would be organized and paid for; private organizations would be allowed to compete for the opportunity to provide care. The Health and Social Care Act explicitly used the (privatizing) language of choice and competition to describe the restructuring of the NHS that was being legislated. In addition to these shifts in the ways in which national health care would be organized, the cuts to social services and benefits that emerged from Osborne's and Smith's program of austerity have been extreme. Moreover, in the general election of 2015, in an upset that few had predicted, the Tories won outright, and thus continued their austerity agenda without their coalition partners. In his 2010 budget, Osborne had laid out his intention of cutting £11 billion per year in benefits (following a drastic initial cut that was to be even larger) (Vale). In his 2015 budget, delivered a month after the Tories began governing alone, he announced that an additional £12 billion would be cut from the benefits budget. Osborne's 2015 budget was approved by Parliament in October that year. It in some ways made austerity in the UK permanent, as a component of the budget mandated that the government run a surplus in so-called "normal" years. Such a target, which accepted without question that deficits and deficit spending are signs of an ongoing "crisis;' essentially precluded the possibility that the austerity cuts from 2010 to 2015 might be reversed. Although Corbyn as the new Labour leader rallied the opposition to vote against Osborne's budget, twenty-one New Labour members of Parliament abstained from the vote, tacitly affirming an ongoing cross-party common sense that some form of permanent austerity is necessary. Cameron continued to govern as prime minister until July 2016, when he resigned following the results of a popular referendum he had called on British membership in the European Union. In a move dubbed "Brexit" (British exit), the country voted to leave the EU. Cameron, who had argued strongly against that result, stepped down and was shortly thereafter replaced by his former home secretary, Theresa May. Although I discuss Brexit briefly in my epilogue, Crip Times is largely about the Cameron years, when the Conservative austerity agenda was secured.25 'The politics of affect that has accompanied this agenda has been multivalent- a limited but spectacular celebration of disability and disability identity (most obvious around the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games that I consider in chapter 1) having coexisted with a concerted campaign to cast recipients of benefits as "scroungers" or "spongers" or "shirkers:' Although Thatcher herself rode to power as early as May 1978 rhetorically introducing phrases such as "we should back the workers and not the shirkers" (qtd. in Jones, Chavs 62), phrases such as "benefit scroungers" or "shirkers" did not appear with frequency in the British press prior to the Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition; they are now ubiquitous. 26 "Shirkers" are generally opposed to "strivers" in the contemporary scenario, and "strivers" take a US-style, neoliberal "personal responsibility" for their actions. Popular culture has disseminated the idea of "scroungers;' who supposedly don't take personal responsibility and who cheat the system, in numerous venues, most infamously perhaps in the series Benefits Street that aired on Britain's Channel 4 in January 2014. Benefits Street followed the lives of residents of James Turner Street in Birmingham, supposedly a location with one of the highest number of benefits recipients in the country. Those living "life on the dole" (and Benefits Britain: Life on the Dole was in fact the title of yet another television "expose;' that aired on Channel 5) have been subject to a constant suspicion that turns attention away from class inequalities and toward (individualized) behavior. Owen Jones's Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class makes dear that the stereotyping of poor people, especially poor youth, as dirty "chavs" ( a derogatory term used to mock supposedly antisocial behavior and outlandish dress) has been a largely successful rhetorical strategy materializing what Cameron called in a key 2010 campaign speech a "Broken Britain'' that needs behavioral change ( and of course, "personal responsibility") more than anything like class solidarity or economic justice (which, from Thatcher's Britain to Cameron's, has been cast as completely anachronistic) (Jones, Chavs 78).